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THE PROGRESS CLAUSE
The Congress shall have the power... To Promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.
-U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Clause 8
Progress Is Our Most Important Product
-Ronald Reagan, for General Electric
2
I. INTRODUCTION: WHY DEFINE "PROGRESS"?
A. The Stakes in Positive Law
I am fairly sure of what Article I, section 8, clause 8 means. I am
hopeful, furthermore, that the core of my reading will be accepted by
otherwise disparate interpreters of the Constitution: "progress" means
"spread," i.e. diffusion, distribution.3 To the extent that Congress
chooses not to act under this clause,4 the default position is that each
person in the United States has a property right not to be excluded
1. Earlier academics call this the "Copyright and Patent Clause." Since neither
"copyright" nor "patent" appears in the text, I have been using the phrase, "Intel-
lectual Property Clause." See Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestibility?
The Intersection of the Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of the Consti-
tution: Beyond a Critique of Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L.
REv. 259, 260 & n.1 (1995). That name, however, both uses words not in the text
and incorrectly implies the primacy of the rights granted patent and copyright
holders by Congress. Yochai Benkler has proposed the textual "Exclusive Rights
Clause." See Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitu-
tional Foundations of the Public Domain, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2002) (on file
with author) available at http//www.law.duke.edu/pd/papersbenkler.pdf (last
visited Nov. 2001). As this Article explains, the best name would be the "Pro-
gress Clause." Robert Goldwin earlier suggested the same name, but under the
assumption that "progress" referred to "quality improvement." See ROBERT A.
GoLDwIN, WHY BLAcKs, WOMEN, AND JEws ARE NOT IENTIONED IN THE CONSTI-
TUTION AND OTHER UNORTHODOX VIEws 37, 37-41 (1990).
2. This slogan was registered by General Electric with the U.S. P.T.O. on July 7,
1964 for, inter alia, "periodic entertainment programs" and was first used in com-
merce May 2, 1950. The service mark registration has expired. See Registration
No. 0772966, at http'//tess.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc@statp=jpbc4.5.45 (last
visited Nov. 19, 2001). The slogan climaxed the institutional advertising pitches
on the General Electric Theater which ruled Sunday night on CBS from February
1953 through May 1962. For most of this time, the slogan was delivered by proto-
United States President Ronald Regan. G.E. claimed that "[pirogress in products
goes hand in hand with providing progress in the human values that enrich the
lives of us all." See William L. Bird, General Electric Theater, at http-l/
www.mbcnet.org/ETV/G/htmlG/generalelect.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
3. See infra Sections IV and V. This is the core of my analysis and has the strongest
evidentiary support.
4. Congress, however, passed both the first patent and the first copyright statute in
the second session of the first congress. Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109; Copyright
Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124. Neither the patent nor the copyright statute has ever
been allowed to lapse.
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from publicly accessible knowledge and technology.5 Congress has
only a very limited power to create private quasi-property, i.e., rights
to exclude the rest of the commoners. 6 Congress may only create tem-
porary individual rights for "authors" or "inventors" to exclude others
from use of "their respective writings and discoveries" when such indi-
vidual rights "promote" the spread of knowledge ("science") and tech-
nology ("useful arts").
I am much more certain that my suggested doctrine is not yet posi-
tive law. If the Supreme Court followed my analysis, it would reverse
the pro-copyright holder decisions of Universal City Studios v. Corley7
and Eldred v. Reno.8
My research shows four possible 1780s meanings of "progress" in
the Progress Clause: quality improvement in the knowledge base,
quantity improvement in the knowledge base (judged numerically),
quantity improvement in the knowledge base (judged economically),
and spread (distribution to the population).9 Of these, quantity is the
5. See Malla Pollack, The Owned Public Domain: The Constitutional Right Not to Be
Excluded-Or the Supreme Court Chose the Right Breakfast Cereal in Kellogg v.
National Biscuit Co., 22 HASTINGS CoMMi. & EN'r. L.J. 265, 267-291 (2000). This
is the most disputable part of my thesis.
6. Such a right to exclude is closer to a privilege allowing use than to a fee simple
absolute. The remaindermen (the commoners) hold a future interest which will
ripen into a much more robust quasi-property right. "Commoner" here means a
person with an ownership right not to be excluded from using the resource, the
"common," in 18th century parlance. This is John Locke's definition of "prop-
erty," something "[t]he nature whereof is, that without a Man's own consent it
cannot be taken from him." JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 195
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1690). This is a property law
regime and should not be confused with the nature of goods "owned." The defini-
tion includes both common-property regimes (where a limited number of persons
have rights not to be excluded) and open-access regimes where no one may be
excluded. See Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Artifacts, Facilities, and Content:
Information as a Common-Pool Resource, DUIE L.J. (forthcoming 2002) (on file
with author), available at http://www.duke.edu/pd/papers/ostramhes.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 2001). Unlike grass for sheep, or books in libraries, ideas are neither
rival nor subtractable.
7. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001), affg sub nom., Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (upholding anti-circumvention
provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205
(2000) [hereinafter DMCAI). See infra text accompanying notes 23-32.
8. 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 [hereinafter CTEA]), cert. granted sub nom.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002). See infra text accompanying notes 33-
54 (discussing CTEA); see also Golan v. Ashcroft, Civ. 01-B-1854 (D. Colo.; com-
plaint filed Sept. 19, 2001) (raising constitutional issues with both CTEA and
Copyright Term Restoration Act, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 104A), at httpl/
con.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/golanvashcroft/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2002).
9. See infra notes 215-230 and accompanying text.
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least supportable.' 0 Quality has low support and creates problems in
context." Spread has the highest support.' 2
The most charitable reading of Congress' post-1970 intellectual
property enactments might be that Congress sees the "Copyright and
Patent Industries" as the strongest part of the current United States
economy' 3 and, therefore, assumes that giving these industries
whatever they request is the best policy. This approach ignores the
probability that current major stakeholders are merely trying to pro-
tect and enlarge their own profit shares-even when self-protection
blocks "the progress of science and useful arts," in any meaning of the
phrase.' 4
If Congress is actually considering the language of the Constitu-
tion, Congress appears to be operating on the naive theory that since
some protection promotes writings and discoveries, more protection
necessarily promotes even more or even better writings and discover-
ies.1 5 Even leaving aside major normative and baseline problems, giv-
ing one entity exclusive intellectual property rights to a creation
blocks other creative people from producing related works and discov-
10. See infra notes 171-172, 215 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 165-188, 215-230 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 215-230 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Statement of Howard Coble, Chair of Subcommittee on Courts and In-
tellectual Property, at hearing of July 27, 2000, at 1, at http:/www.house.gov/
judiciary/cob10727.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2000) ("Congress has enacted [intel-
lectual property] laws since 1790, resulting in the development of American intel-
lectual property that is the envy of the world. It is one of the top US exports,
generates billions of dollars in revenue, creates jobs, and enriches the lives of the
American people and the world.").
14. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR.
L. REv. 275 (1989) (discussing stake-holder negotiation process used for drafting
United States copyright statutes and how this process allows entrenched inter-
ests to block technological change in order to protect their current market power);
L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v. Reno: An Example of the Law of Unintended Conse-
quences, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 230 (2001) (asserting copyright industry lobby-
ists have written United States copyright statutes since 1905). Only the
irrational assume that projects endorsed by paid lobbyists and projects in the
public interest are the same thing. See RICHARD E. BALDWIN & FREDERIC ROB-
ERT-NICOUD, ENTRY AND AswmmirRc LOBBYING: WHY GovERmNs PICK LOSERS
(Nat'l Bur. of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W8756) (asserting that groups
in economic decline spend more on lobbying), available at http//papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid=299170 (last visited Feb. 7, 2002); AKIRA OKADA &
ARNO RIEDL, RECIPROCITY, INEFFICIENCY AM SOCIAL EXCLUSION (Tingergen Insti-
tute Discussion Paper No. TI 99-04411, 2001) (asserting that exclusive coalitions
result in large efficiency losses), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract..id=289185 (last visited Feb. 28, 2002).
15. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
"Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REv. 462 (1998) (criticizing economic approach
towards copyright policy); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000) (same).
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eries.16 Transaction costsl7 and right-holders' biases 8 increase these
blocks.
Correcting the reading of the Progress Clause by recognizing that
"progress" involves dissemination, as opposed to qualitative improve-
ment of the knowledge base, has important results. Using the proper
original reading should result in judicial trimming of congressional
over-protection. For the argument in this section, I will assume mere
rational basis review. The review standard should be higher because
(i) Congress has never bothered to take the limits in the Clause seri-
ously, (ii) Congress is treading close to textual limits on its power, 19
16. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1086 (1989) (calling for an experimental use exception to
patent infringement because "enforcement of [patents] against subsequent re-
searchers can sometimes interfere with further progress in the field of the inven-
tion."). The level of protection is an especially complex issue because larger firms
and firms holding larger patent portfolios have greater ability to chill other enti-
ties' research and development behavior. See JEAN 0. LANJouw & MARK
ScHANKERmAN, ENFORCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 3-44 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 729, 2001), available at http'//pa-
pers.nbcr.org/papers/w8656 (last visited Dec. 21, 2001) (presenting results of em-
pirical study of U.S. patent litigation). A similar portfolio advantage has been
hypothesized in copyright. See Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children:
Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 23, 106-111 (2001) (explain-
ing power of holding a large copyright portfolio).
17. For example, copyright no longer requires notice or prompt registration. See 17
U.S.C. §§ 401(a), 408(a) (2000). How do you make an offer without knowing the
identity of the copyright holder? See Jessica Litman, Remarks on The Public Do-
main and the Commons: History & Theory, at Duke Conference on the Public
Domain (Nov. 2001), available at http,//realserver.law.duke.edu/ramgen/pub-
licdomain/pubdom_l.smil (last visited Dec. 26, 2001) (pointing out that the
United States'joining the Berne Convention has resulted in reversal of the base-
line assumption that any copyrightable item without clear notice was available
for use without permission or liability).
18. Such biases support the fair use status of much parody. See Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591-92 (1994) (recognizing that holder of copy-
right in original is unlikely to give permission to parody underlying work); see
also Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600
(1982).
19. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing enbanc) ("I do not accept that it is sufficient for Congress
to merely articulate some hypothetical basis to justify the claimed exercise of an
enumerated power."); Reply Brief of Appellant, Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (99-00065), reprinted in 18 CARDOZO ARTS & Er. L. REv. 655,
662-63 (2000) (arguing that Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), was not decided under rational basis review).
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and (iii) copyright statues are limitations on speech. 20 The review
standard issue, however, will have to wait for another article.2 1
For example, let us assume just for the current argument, that
Congress asserts that it actually has a rational basis22 for believing
that making digital circumvention and circumvention technology ille-
gal 23 will affect the supply of new writings and discoveries at the mar-
gin. Let us also assume, arguendo, that the only relevant arguments
pertain to the purpose section of the Progress Clause. Somewhere
some writers would not compose and release new works if they cannot
prevent persistent computer wizards from bypassing technological
protections. They will write and publish the works only if they are
assured protection from computer wizards. Let us dub this set of writ-
ers "Digital Control Driven." Some other writers, of course, would be
blocked from composition by a ban on technological circumvention and
circumvention devices. They will be unable to get permission to incor-
porate indispensable bits of pre-existing works into their creations
and will be unable to act on the assumption that the uses are fair24
because they are unable to bypass the technological protections guard-
ing the older works.2 5 Let us dub this set of writers "Public Domain
Driven."
Congress bases the ban on circumvention and circumvention tech-
nology on alternate theories. First, if this protection is granted, the
Digital Control Driven are likely to produce more writings than the
Public Domain Driven will fail to produce. 26 Second, the writings pro-
20. See Reply Brief, supra note 19, at 668-69; Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Com-
mon Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74
N.Y.U. L. Ray. 354 (1999).
21. See Malla Pollack, Dealing with Old Father William, Loy. L-A. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2002).
22. Congress notoriously does not look at the facts allegedly supporting industry
cries for greater rights to exclude. See, e.g., Steven Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright in Books, 84 HARv. L. REv. 281 (1970) (general statement); Malla Pol-
lack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the
Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17
CARDozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 47, 89-97 (1999) (discussing lack of evidence support-
ing Congress' "factual findings" in proposed database protection bill).
23. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H7102 (daily ed. Aug 4, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Slaughter) (praising Digital Millennium Copyright Act because it helps "combat
the devastating loses to American companies that are being caused by the inter-
national piracy of copyrighted works.").
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). Even without technological barriers, the cost of fac-
ing copyright enforcement suits presumably chills a large number of arguably
fair uses.
26. The relationship between quantity and quality is discussed infra section IV. As
to this specific statute, the balance is skewed because the method of protection
strongly discourages quality improvement in one specific "useful art," encryption
technology. See, e.g., Copyrights: Content Owners Making New DMCA Claims;
GNUTELLA sites, SMI Expert All Get Letters, BNA PATENT, TRADEMARK, & COPY-
2001]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
duced by the Digital Control Driven are likely to improve human un-
derstanding more than would the writings produced by the Public
Domain Driven. Similar arguments could be made regarding exten-
sions of the term or scope of either copyright or patent.
As long as "progress" refers to the Idea of Progress, the constitu-
tional issue involves the value or quantity of the works produced-
largely regardless of their availability or cost to users. Of course, "The
Idea of Progress" and "spread" are not a dichotomy; they are opposite
poles on a continuum. "Spread" requires works to share. "Quality
works" are useless without some users; the users, however, may be
limited to a small elite section of the populace who work on the cut-
ting-edge of knowledge.27 Nevertheless, if the core meaning of "pro-
gress" is "quality improvement of the knowledge base," the courts are
extremely unlikely to hold the legislation unconstitutional. To void
the statute, a court would have to insist that Congress' theoretically
informed guess on the Digital Control Driven/Public Domain Driven
balance is irrational. Considering the complexity and diverse conclu-
sions of the relevant literature, 28 a court is unlikely to go this far.
If "progress" means "spread," a court is more likely to second guess
Congress. Now, Congress is required to prioritize public access to
works over the mere existence of works. The change in priorities
forces Congress to show that the additional rights to exclude create
sufficient new access 29 to works to counter balance (a) the ability of
right holders to restrict access to works whose copyrights have ex-
pired, (b) the ability of right holders to restrict fair uses of works cov-
ered by copyright, (c) the ability of right holders to restrict access to
the uncopyrightable elements of copyrightable works, and (d) the abil-
ity of right holders to leverage technological protection into contracts
RIGHT DAILY, May 3, 2001 (reporting cease and desist letter sent by the Secure
Digital Music Initiative warning Princeton University professor Edward Felton
not to release his research on decryption technology for peer review; Felton de-
cided not to present paper at a conference; SDMI's attorney then denied intention
to sue academics).
27. Reading "progress" as "spread," does not eliminate the constitutional basis of the
requirement for non-obviousness in patent law. As to the "useful arts," quality
improvement is required by the words "inventors" and "discoveries." As to "sci-
ence," a modieum of quality is required by the words "writings" and "authors."
28. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE, THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM IN TRANSITION: POLICY INNOVA-
TION AND THE INNOVATION PROCESS (Nat'l Bur. Econ. Research, Working Paper,
1999) (reviewing recent economic analyses of patent protection); A. Samuel Oddi,
Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 268 n.6
(1996) (mentioning conflicting literature on patents' economic effects).
29. The basic question would be how many times a person accessed a work. P x W =
A. Distribution of the people with access (geographically, demographically, etc.)
might be relevant, as might the diversity etc. of the works accessed. The Com-
merce Committee admitted that the DMCA would lower public access to works.
See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 26 (1998).
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limiting downstream distribution of works.30 Now Congress has a
much higher evidentiary problem with showing a good faith belief in a
"rational basis" for its legislative balance of the creation/dissemina-
tion balance.3 1
What about the Copyright Term Extension Act?32 The District of
Columbia Circuit held the act constitutional because "to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts" was not a substantive limit on
Congress' power.3 3 The majority, however, went one unnecessary step
further, and asserted in dicta that even if this language contained
some limit, the necessary and proper clause allows Congress to pro-
mote progress by increasing the incentive for copyright holders to pre-
serve old works, providing the sole example of movies in need of
restoration.34 Does this demonstrate that reading "progress" as
"spread" would make the CTEA harder to assail? I think the opposite.
Eldred was decided on the vacuity of the purpose section of the Pro-
gress Clause. If a court thoughtfully considers "progress" (under any
definition), the CTEA should be held unconstitutional in all its appli-
cations. The Eldred court merely invoked the alleged upside of the
change without considering the downside- an improper way to do
any type of cost/benefit analysis.
30. But see Jane Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemi-
nation, 101 COLUm. L. REv. 1613, 1618, 1636 (2001) (asserting possible benefits to
public from DMCA because inter alia (i) Library of Congress's first study of stat-
ute's effects did not find disaster, and (ii) some copyright holders might not re-
lease works in digital form sans DMCA). Professor Ginsburg's brilliant and
nuanced analysis over looks, inter alia, (i) the extreme narrowness of the Li-
brary's study, (ii) the existence of works whose copyright holders are unclear, and
(iii) the DMCA's grant to copyright holders of power to limit access to non-copy-
rightable material.
31. The hurdle, of course, would vary depending on which brand of rational review
the court employed. The Supreme Court has looked hard at Congress' evidence in
several recent cases where Congress had purported to abrogate state sovereign
immunity. See Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367-72 (2001); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639-
41 (1999). However, rational basis review is most commonly toothless. See, e.g.,
Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 Ky. L.J. 591, 639 (1999-2000) ("Cleburne's im-
plicit challenge to the reigning equal protection paradigm proved to be short-
lived. As things now stand, expecting that a court might invalidate a classifica-
tion subject to rational basis scrutiny is like expecting to win the lottery."). But
see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) ("I do not accept that it is sufficient for Con-
gress to merely articulate some hypothetical basis to justify the claimed exercise
of an enumerated power.").
32. The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827,
added twenty years to copyright term for both pre-existing and new works.
33. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
34. See id. at 379.
2001] 761
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
My reading does destroy one argument against the retrospective
section of the act-the argument that extending existing copyrights
cannot promote progress because this phrase requires each grant to be
paid for with a new work.35 However, the same limitation can be
reached by other textual argument. Let me explain.
The best arguments against the CTEA are not related to the word
"progress." First, looking at policy, the CTEA should fail rational ba-
sis scrutiny because it is a subsidy granted to a small number of large
corporations; copyright is merely a subterfuge used to deflect public
scrutiny and outrage. Any such camouflaged wealth transfer should
be suspect as corrupt 3 6-not rationally related to any legitimate legis-
lative purpose. Such a disguised subsidy to powerful political backers
is even more unacceptable when tied to a copyright grant. The histori-
cal ancestor of the Progress Clause, the English Statute of Monopo-
lies3 7 was the first step in Parliament's control of the royal purse
strings. No Authors' Exclusive Right (AER) or Inventors' Exclusive
Right (IER)38 may be used to bypass full public scrutiny of political
payoffs. 3 9
Second, looking at the words of the Progress Clause, the CTEA's
extension of existing copyrights breaches the barrier erected by the
interaction of "writers," "authors," and "limited times." The Supreme
Court has already read the junction of "writers" and "authors" to re-
quire originality.40 The structure of the Progress Clause ties "limited
times" tightly to author/writing and inventor/discovery. Therefore, in
context, "limited times" should mean that any new term must be pre-
mised on additional contributions of "writings" from "authors" (or dis-
35. See Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 19, at 660-62 (making this argument);
Patterson, supra note 14, at 234 (same).
36. See Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution, 52 FLA. L. REv.
989, 998 n.31 (2000) (discussing related campaign contributions); John M. Garon,
Media & Monopoly in the Information Age, 17 CARDozo ARTs & ENT. L.J. 491,
523-24 nn. 152-156 (same); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on
the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint
on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 1119, 1174-76 (2000); S. REP. No. 104-31 (state-
ment of Senator Brown).
37. 21 Jam., ch. 3 (1624) (Eng.).
38. I use these terms to clearly distinguish the rights allowed by the Constitution
from those Congress has chosen to create by statute (patents and copyrights).
See Pollack, supra note 1, at 291 (introducing terminology and explaining its
usefulness).
39. See Malla Pollack, Purveyance and Power, or Over-Priced Free Lunch: The Intel-
lectual Property Clause as an Ally of the Takings Clause in the Public's Control of
Government, 30 Sw. U. L. REV. 1 (2000) (providing detailed historical backing for
thesis that Progress Clause may not be used to side step government's fiscal
accountability).
40. See Feist Publ'ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346-47 (1991). Simi-
larly, "inventor" and "discovery" have been held to require "non-obviousness" for
patent grants. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-12 (1966).
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coveries from inventors)-new original material. Lengthening
existing copyrights is unconstitutional, regardless of the meaning of
"progress."
Third, the words "limited times" by themselves require a definite
term limit set at the beginning of protection. 4 1 Like patent, copyright
is strongly analogous to a contractual bargain.42 In return for public
availability, the copyright holder is granted a set of rights to exclude.
If Congress later grants additional rights, the copyright holder most
provide new consideration. If Congress enlarges the copyright
holder's power without requiring a quid pro quo, Congress is a dishon-
est agent.43
Fourth, the CTEA only claims to promote "progress," if "progress"
means "economic value." The CTEA's announced primary rationales
are (i) to give copyright holders more of the financial value of works,
and (ii) to help the United States' balance of payments by supporting a
strong export industry.44 Neither of these goals conceivably promote
"progress" if that word means either "quality improvement" or
"spread." At best, these goals might increase the economic value of
"writings." Any such increase, however, is created by statutorily dis-
torting the market-which clearly demonstrates that economic value
and statutory grants are not independent. If "promoting progress" is a
limitation on Congress, therefore, "economic value" is not a possible
translation of "progress."45
Worse, the CTEA's implied assertion that it increases the economic
value of works is an empirical claim made without supporting evi-
dence. The large entities which lobbied for the CTEA obviously be-
lieved that the act would increase the economic value of certain
copyrights to them. Congress made no apparent effort to determine if
the shift of power lowered the total value'of copyrights in general or of
any specific copyright. The legislative history does not discuss the eco-
nomic value of the non-licensed uses foreclosed by term extension.
Cost/benefit analysis cannot be done by listing benefits and ignoring
costs.
41. The use of the plural "times" does not undercut this definition. The plural (i)
allows the original grant to include a renewal term, and (ii) allows patents and
copyrights to have different term limits.
42. See Pollack, supra note 5, at 291-93 (discussing case law support for the bargain
theory of patents).
43. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 36, at 1162-1164 (finding a quidpro quo principle
in the Progress Clause).
44. See S. REP. No. 104-315, at 3-19 (1996). The export rationale is greatly weakened
by the copyright industry's major reliance on foreign-made copies of American
works. See Pollack, supra note 22, at 94-96 (discussing fudge of difference be-
tween "foreign sales" and "exports" in a report submitted to Congress in support
of the DMCA).




If "progress" means "quality improvement," Congress could state
that it believes the extra money which will be acquired by large copy-
right-holding corporations is likely to fund the highest quality works
which will be created in next century. This assumption, however, is
economically irrational.46 Furthermore, the legislative history of the
CTEA does not demonstrate this as Congress' intent.4 7 If a court were
to invoke this as Congress' rational basis for the CTEA, it should be
faulted for using a contrived apologia to side-step judicial responsibil-
ity. Unfortunately, I doubt that the CTEA's opponents could prove the
opposite-that individually written works (which will not be created
because of the CTEA) would have been of higher quality. How do you
prove the quality of works that will not be created? Over-deference to
Congress, therefore, might result in a court's upholding the CTEA.
If "progress" means increase in the number of works, the CTEA
should fail; but proof would be very hard to acquire. At the time an
author is considering creation, or a publisher is considering initial
publication, the additional twenty years (coming only twenty years af-
ter the author dies) is worth about zero.4 8 Humans, however, are not
always good at, or interested in, making this type of cost/benefit pre-
diction.49 Notoriously, few athletes make it rich; yet a disproportion-
ate number of economically disadvantaged youths drop out of school
with the intention of becoming basketball superstars. 5 0 Certainly, the
longer term would cut down availability of building blocks for new
works, but holders of large copyright portfolios would still have
enough stock to keep writing. I do not know of any evidence I could
show the court that would prove the numerical balance favors a
shorter term: proving counterfactuals about likely creation is rather
difficult. Again, judicial over-deference ,to Congress might result in
the CTEA surviving.
46. See Dennis S. Karjala, Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law
Professors in Opposition to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S. 505 "The Copyright Term
Extension Act," Submitted to the Committees on the Judiciary U.S. Senate [and]
U.S. House of Representatives 21 (Jan. 28, 1998), available at http/www.law.asu.
edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/1998Statement.
html (demonstrating irrationality).
47. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Village of Stratton, 122 S. Ct. 2080 (2002)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (objecting to the dissent's reliance on crime prevention
rationale for ordinance inter alia because "there is no indication that the legisla-
tive body that passed the ordinance considered this justification").
48. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 36, at 1173-74 (providing calculations); Karjala,
supra note 46 (demonstrating absence of additional incentive).
49. See, e.g., Timor Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regu-
lation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1998) (discussing cognitive failures common in as-
sessing probabilities); Paul H. Rubin, How Humans Make Political Decisions, 41
JURIMETRIcs J. 337 (2001) (same).
50. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 216-18 (1993).
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If progress means "spread," I cannot guarantee that the CTEA
would fail, but its opponents would have more evidence to show a
court. Extending the United States copyright term extends the term
inside the United States both for domestic works and for works from
other countries.51 By exploring government records, opponents
should be able to develop some quantitative approximation of how
many works of various types are being fenced out of competitive circu-
lation for an additional twenty-years. 52 This large number of works
which may be denied to the entire population of the United States for
an additional twenty-years should compute into an impressive quan-
tity of lost access. 53 Opponents would still have difficulty quantifying
how many new works would be created under the different legal re-
gimes, but now, they would have some very strong figures to show the
court-figures Congress seemingly made no effort to obtain.5 4 Since
the supporters of the CTEA have better access to such statistics than
its opponents, opponents might even convince the court to place a
higher evidentiary burden on the government.
The progress by dissemination claim (that an additional term is
necessary for preservation of old works) furthermore, seems facially
unrealistic. 55 Generally, by fifty years after the death of its author, a
work's market potential has already been tested. An interested dis-
tributor would know which works were worth continued marketing.
Risk would be almost completely eliminated. Common experience
shows that works without copyright protection continue to be pub-
lished-Shakespeare, Milton, and the Bible are easy to find in book
51. See S. REP. No. 104-31 (statement of Senator Brown); Kaijala, supra note 46, at
6-7.
52. In the United States copyright holders are generally allowed to stop all distribu-
tion of a work. See S. REP. No. 104-31 (statement of Senator Brown). To defuse
the (to me transparently unconvincing) argument that copyright holders would
allow most uses if paid, we might be able to estimate the number of works where
locating the copyright holder would be quite difficult or impossible. Copyright
holders might decide that maximum revenue would be produced by creating tem-
porally limited availability. Disney, for example, is heavily advertising that
DVD's of its popular films Pinochio, Mulan, Tarzan, and Snow White and the
Seven Dwarfs will be unavailable after January 31, 2002. See httpl//disney.go/
comldisneyvideoslofersltime.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2002) (on file with the au-
thor). According to a national television advertising campaign, Snow White is
allegedly disappearing into the vault for ten years.
53. Perhaps the "harmonization" rationale should be read as an assertion that the
CTEA will increase global access to works by lowering trade barriers. See S. REP.
104-315 at 6, 10-11. Even accepting arguendo that access to works will increase
outside the U.S. (even though it will decrease within the U.S.), the Constitution
aims to promote the welfare of United States. U.S. CoNsT. pmbl.
54. Brief for Petitioners, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 372, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert.
granted sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002), available at http'J/
eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft.
55. See also Karjala, supra note 46, at 21-22 (arguing that businesses' willingness to
take risks is not related to income available from unrelated projects).
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stores.56 If Congress considered crumbling old works to be important,
furthermore, the CTEA is hardly a proportional response. The num-
ber of crumbling old works is presumably only a small subset of the
old works granted the additional term.57 Preservation seems mere
camouflage; Congress did not limit the liability of persons who re-
stored old-works after a reasonable, but unsuccessful, search for the
current copyright holder. A court should have enough hard evidence
to overthrow the CTEA on the ground that no rational legislature
could conclude that it increased public access to writings.
In sum, reading "progress" as "spread" increases the possibility of
effective court over-sight of Congress' intellectual property legisla-
tion.5 8 This definition might also effect how the courts deal with In-
ternet issues such as causes of action for trespass to websites, and
attempts to require permission to set up hyperlinks.5 9 I do not, of
course, claim that this change would require the Supreme Court to
reign-in Congress.
B. The Definitional Hole
The Supreme Court has never purported to define the individual
word "progress" in the Progress Clause.60 So far, the Court has said
that the entire progress limitation-in conjunction with the require-
56. See S. REP. No. 104-31 (statement of Senator Brown); Garon, supra note 36, at
520 (discussing study showing classics' availability).
57. Two major restorers of old films, argued against the CTEA, partly because they
had difficult in locating copyright holders in order to obtain permission to restore
old works. See Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 19.
58. I am not arguing that more court power is necessarily good. I am merely reacting
to the facts that (a) Congress has abjectly failed to protect the public domain, and
(b) public choice theory suggests we should expect a continuing institutional bias
towards congressional over-protection of intellectual property. See, e.g., Mark A.
Lemley, The Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L. J.
529, 531-34 (2000). But see Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude:
Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2187, 2234-39 (2000) (argu-
ing that over-protective legislation is usually blocked by competing interest
groups).
59. See Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. S .ALL & EmERGING Bus. L. 27
(2000) (suggesting that nuisance law provides better policy fit than does trespass
or property law for cases where web-site operators wish to prevent types of ac-
cess). But see I. Trotter Hardy, The Ancient Doctrine of Trespass to Web Sites,
1996 J. ONLINE L. art. 7 http:/www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/articles.shtml
(arguing that web sites should be protected by analogy to property law).
60. This Clause is the only use of the word "progress" in the Constitution. See
CHARLES W. STEARNS, Concordance to the Constitution, in THURSTON GREENE,
THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION: A SouRCEBOOK AND GUIDE TO THE IDEAS,
TERMs, AND VOCABULARY OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 969, 1009 (1991).
This concordance stops before the Reconstruction Era amendments. See Thur-
ston Greene, Preface, in THURSTON GREENE, THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITU-
TION: A SOURCEBOOK AND GUIDE TO THE IDEAS, TERMS, AND VOCABULARY OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION XV, xviii (1991). The author supplies no sources for
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ment that the res protected be either the "writing" of an "author" or
the "discovery" of an "inventor"-relates to Congress' supposed inabil-
ity to remove res from the public domain,61 the non-obviousness re-
quirement to obtain a patent, 62 and the minimal standard of
originality in copyright.63 Additionally, the entire progress limitation
has some relationship both to public availability of technology and
writings,6 4 atd to the uncopyrightabilty of facts.65
Academic literature is also oddly reticent about the eighteenth cen-
tury meaning of the word "progress." I know of no article presenting a
detailed explication. Most scholars seem to assume that "progress" in
the Progress Clause relates to the well-known Enlightenment Idea of
Progress: 66 all is getting better in this, the best of all possible,
explaining the 1789 word "progress." See id. at xi (demonstrating absence of
"progress" from alphabetical list of words explained in source book).
61. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) ("Congress may not authorize
the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the
public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available."). But see
17 U.S.C. § 104A (purporting to restore copyright in certain works which had
entered the public domain due to the right holders' failure to comply with formal-
ities); Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution:
A Historical Perspective, 49 J. CopuGHT Soc'y 19, 46-52, 58-86 (2001) (discuss-
ing copyrights and patents which were revived by private laws); Memorandum in
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon
Which Relief Can Be Granted at 22-34, Lawrence Golan v. John Ashcroft, Civil
Action No. 01-B-1854 (D. Colorado), available at http//con.law.harvard.edul
openlaw/golanvashcroft (last visited Jan. 10, 2002) (arguing that restoration is
constitutional (i) under the Copyright Clause as demonstrated by first Congress'
passage of statute providing copyright to works already printed in the U.S., and
(ii) under the Treaty Power as demonstrated by Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416, 432 (1920)).
62. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 9.
63. See Feist Publ'ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
64. See, e.g., Fogarty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) (stating that copy-
right's core purpose is "promoting broad public availability of literature, music,
and other arts"); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
164 (1989) (clarifying that Court's earlier pre-emption cases "protect more than
the right of the public to contemplate the abstract beauty of an otherwise unpro-
tected intellectual creation-they assure its efficient reduction to practice and
sale in the marketplace").
65. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 344 ("[Flacts are not copyrightable.").
66. Even my earlier articles may be read as making this assumption. Two interest-
ing articles do analyze the "Idea of Progress" as applied to intellectual property.
See Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BuFF. INT.
PRoP. L.J. 3 (2001) (discussing "the progress of' as central to the Clause, but
assuming without discussion that these words refer to "the Idea of Progress.");
Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent
Power, 43 DEPAUL L. Rav. 97 (1993) (same). Most articles merely assert the rele-
vance of "The Idea of Progress." See, e.g., Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A
Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
50, 54 (1948) (asserting the identity of the three phrases "To promote the pro-
gress of useful arts," "To promote the progress of technology," and "to accelerate
technological progress"); Arthur H. Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of
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worlds67 (smile when you say that, post-modern human).68 Accepting
this premise, Robert Merges asserts that the Framers' unfounded op-
timism cannot support any meaningful limitations on Congressional
power.6 9
Oh, the power of rampant anachronism and assumption! I agree
with some of the general assumptions about "progress." The Idea of
Progress had begun to flower by the late eighteenth century.70 This
Idea of Progress was an axiomatic, background, cultural assumption
Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 5, 10-11 & n.11 (1966) (looking at 1818 edi-
tion of Samuel Johnson's dictionary which lists both qualitative and physical
movement definitions of "progress"; yet assuming without discussion that "pro-
gress" in the Progress Clause means the advancement of the human knowledge
base and, therefore, concluding that "progress" merely requires some utility" in
each invention).
67. See VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE ch. 1, 1.30; ch. 6, 1.28; ch. 30, 1.88. See also ADAM SMITH,
THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 236 (Liberty Fund paperback ed., Indianapo-
lis 1984) (1759) (discussing "the idea of that divine Being, whose benevolence and
wisdom have, from all eternity, contrived and conducted the immense machine of
the universe, so as at all times to produce the greatest possible quantity of
happiness").
68. See, e.g., GABRIEL A. ALMOND ET AL., PROGRESS AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1982) (col-
lecting essays on the Idea of Progress); HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY
541-43 (1899) (arguing that technological advancement acerbates the problems
caused by inequality in wealth, that increasing general prosperity does not lead
to the end of disparities in wealth, that wealth disparities lead to the decline of
civilizations, and suggesting the only solution is to abolish private property in
land); GEORGES SOREL, THE ILLUSIONS OF PROGRESS, at xlii-xliiii, xlv (John Stan-
ley & Charlotte Stanley trans., 1969) (presenting a Marxist account of"progress"
as a theory supporting the dominance of the bourgeois, a "charlatan dogma").
69. See Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Prop-
erty Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L. J. 577, 587 (1999) (stating that "[gliven a constitutional provision rooted in a
blind faith in "progress," we cannot read in historically contingent limitations on
patentable subject matter" but failing to cite or discuss literature arguing the
contrary position). Edward Walterscheid has recently suggested a different read-
ing which gives Congress even more power: "The Congress shall have Power...
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts [including] by securing for
limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." Edward C. Walterscheid, The Nature of the Intellec-
tual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective (Part I), 83 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 763, 767-68 (2001). But see L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY
W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAw OF USERS' RIGHTS 49 (1991)
(asserting that key value in Progress Clause is promoting learning by the public;
second value is preserving the public domain; benefitting the author is merely
instrumental).
70. Compare J.B. BUnY, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 192-94 (Dover Paperback ed. 1955)
(1932) (claiming that first clear and complete exposition of the idea of progress
was L'an 2440, a utopian fantasy first published anonymously in 1770 and sup-
pressed in France), with ROBERT NISBET, HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS, at xi
(Transaction paperback ed. 1994) (insisting that the idea of progress goes back to
the ancient Greeks and Romans; idea of progress can be traced in a continuous
line of works starting with St. Augustine).
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in the United States by the mid-nineteenth century.7 1 But none of
this evidences that the American-English word "progress" meant the
same thing in 1789 that it meant in 1850 or means in 2001.
This definitional reticence has practical consequences. Unless
"progress" is an independently monitored, objectively measurable
goal, Congress' discretion to transfer the public domain to private
right-holders is effectively almost unbounded. The other textual
fences in the Progress Clause have already been breached. "Limited
times" has been statutorily stretched from fourteen years72 to seventy
years after the death of the author.7 3 One court even approved Con-
gress's purported creation of perpetual rights to prevent fixation of
sound recordings without the performers' permission.7 4 An "author"
is ""he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker; one who
completes a work of science or literature."75 "Writings," congruently,
include "the literary productions of those authors ... [including] all
forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, &c., by which the ideas
in the mind of the author are given visible expression"76 limited only
by a weak originality requirement.77 "Inventions" may include "any-
thing under the sun that is made by man"7 8 including living entities7 9
71. See NISBET, supra note 70, at 204 ("By the second half of the nineteenth century,
the concept of progress had become almost as sacred to Americans of all classes
as any formal religious precept.").
72. See Patent Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109, § 1 ("term not exceeding fourteen Years");
Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124, § 1 (14 year term with additional 14 years to
be granted only on additional application).
73. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (copyright term for works by natural authors). The copyright
term for anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for hire is 95
years from the year of first publication or 120 years from creation, which ever
occurs first. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c). The term for patents is shorter. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 154(a)(2), 154(b) (utility patents end 20 years from date of application with
certain exemptions); 35 U.S.C. § 173 (design patents last for 14 years from the
date of grant); 35 U.S.C. § 161 (plant patents have the same term as utility
patents).
74. See 17 U.S.C. § 1101. This statute was upheld against constitutional challenge.
See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
Mar. 27, 2001, 2000 LEXIS 2203.
75. Burrow-Giles Lithographing Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884) (holding
that photograph of Oscar Wilde is copyrightable).
76. See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 57-58 (citing "Worcester"). Presumably, the Court
relied upon Worcester's Dictionary. See Brief on the Part of the Defendant in
Error at 3, id. ("Author: He to whom anything owes its origin; originator; creator,
maker; first cause.-Worcester's Diet.").
77. See Feist Publ'ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358-59 (1991) (stat-
ing that "[oiriginality [in factual compilations] requires only that the author
make the selection or arrangement independently.., and that it display some
minimal level of creativity" or display a mere "creative spark").
78. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. No. 1979
(1951)). But see Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business
Method Patents: Common Sense, Congressional Consideration, and Constitu-
tional History, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, at nn.24-29 and accompa-
20011
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
and business methods,80 provided that any purported invention is not
obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art.8 L
True, the Supreme Court8 2 has repeatedly stated that Congress'
power to create private intellectual property is limited by the
"promot[ion] of the progress of science and the useful arts," the recited
purpose of Authors' Exclusive Rights (AERs) and Inventors' Exclusive
Rights (IERs).83 The Court, however, has yet to void any Congres-
nying text (2002) (pointing out Supreme Court's distortion of original language of
report).
79. See, e.g., U.S. Pat. No. 6,323,390 for Transgenic Mouse Models for Human Blad-
der Cancer, available at http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index/html (last visited Dec.
20, 2001).
80. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-77
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (declaring nonexistence of so-called business method exception to
patentability). But see John I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts,
Part II, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 487, 494-99 (1952) (arguing that business methods
are not included in the "useful arts"); Pollack, supra note 78, at section V.B
(same); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV.
1139, 1169-75 (1999) (same).
81. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
82. The D.C. Circuit, on the contrary, rejected the argument that "[tihe introductory
language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on congressional power."
Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981). This statement was
merely dicta in Schnapper which approved copyright in a bicentennial movie
commissioned by the federal government. The D.C. Circuit, however, recently
relied on this language (among other grounds) to uphold the Copyright Term Ex-
tension Act of 1998. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 372, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2001),
cert. granted sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002). But see Eldred
v. Reno, 255 F.3d 849, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J, dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
83. I use these terms to clearly distinguish the rights allowed by the Constitution
from those Congress has chosen to create by statute (patents and copyrights).
See Pollack, supra note 1, at 291 (introducing terminology and explaining its use-
fulness). The relevant Supreme Court cases are: New York Times Co. v. Tasini,
533 U.S. 483, 121 S. Ct. 2381, 2401, 2403 n.20 (2001)(Stevens, J., dissenting);
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574-76 (1994); Fogarty v. Fan-
tasy, 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 349, 354 (1991); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 146-48, 150, 151, 157, 164-65, 167 (1989); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558, 563, 580, 589 (1985); Sony Corp. v. Universal
City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Crop., 416 U.S.
470, 480-81, 484 (1974); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 546, 555 (1973);
Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887,890-93 (1971); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
5-6, 9, 10 (1966); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp.,
340 U.S. 147, 155 (1951); Automatic Radio Mfg. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 399
U.S. 827, 836-37, 839 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Special Equip. Co. v. Coe,
324 U.S. 370, 746-48 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal,
286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932); Ware v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 327-29, 330
(1858); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654, 668 (1834); Shaw v. Cooper,




sional largess on this basis.8 4 The Court has never even checked to
see if Congress purposely or rationally reached the conclusion that
some statutory scheme does, or is likely to, "promote progress." 8 5 The
Court's invocations of "progress," furthermore, are clearly dicta in all
but two cases;S6 even in these cases, most (or perhaps all) of the ar-
ticulated limitation rests on other words in the Clause.87 These cases,
furthermore, merely construe and enforce statutes. By the narrowest
definition of "holding," we have no Supreme Court holding on the
meaning or enforceability of the "progress" limitation in the Progress
Clause.
The Progress Clause's limit should have real bite, because it should
constrain the Commerce Clause by negative implication.8 8 Such an
implied limit should exist because the Court has held that the "uni-
formity" limit in the Bankruptcy Clause cannot be bypassed by invoca-
tion of the Commerce Clause.S9  The Progress Clause/Commerce
84. The Court did void the first federal trademark statute as, inter alia, not limited to
"writings" of "authors," but that statute did not enlarge common law substantive
rights. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. (18 Otto) 82 (1879).
85. J.E.M. Agriculture v. Pioneer Int'l, 122 S. Ct. 593 (2001), ignored this issue, see
id. at 596 (stating question presented is merely statutory construction), even
though the constitutional issue was raised in the Brief of Amicus Malla Pollack
and Other Law Professors. See http'//jurist.law.pitt.edu/amicusjem.vpioneer.
pdf (last visited Dec. 25, 2001).
86. Feist, 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Graham, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
87. Author/writing in Feist; inventor/discovery in Graham.
88. Negative implication was a common eighteenth century method of legal drafting.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (The plan of the conven-
tion declares that the power of Congress ... shall extend to certain enumerated
cases. This specification ofparticulars evidently excludes all pretension to a gen-
eral legislative authority."); id. No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing preg-
nant negatives in relation to the taxing power); id. No. 84 (discussing the danger
of including an incomplete list of rights); I Wnzujrv WINSLow CRossKEY, Pouirics
AN THE CoNsTrruTIoN 486 (1953) ("[The enumerating of particular governmen-
tal powers in order to express limitations upon them was a favorite device of the
Federal Convention.") (emphasis in original). Congress, furthermore, only has
"the legislative powers" which were "herein granted." U.S. CoNs. art. I., § 1. In
contrast, the President has "the executive power," id. art. I, § 1, and the Su-
preme Court and lower federal courts have "the judicial power of the United
States," id. art. I, § 1. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88
VA. L. RE,. 327, 336-38 (2002) (making this textual point).
89. See Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457,465 (1982); see also Paul
J. Heald, The Vices of Originality, 1991 Sup. CT. REv. 143, 168-75 (arguing that
Gibbons should prevent Congress from granting copyright in sweat works); Pol-
lack, supra note 21, at 57-62 (supporting even stronger reading of Gibbons). But
see Jane Ginsburg, 'No Sweat?": Copyright and Other Protection of Works of In-
formation After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 CoLum. L. REV. 338, 369-74 (1992)
(proposing narrower reading of Gibbons). See also Heald & Sherry, supra note
36 (arguing that the Clause contains four limiting principles: the Suspect Grant
Principle, the Quid Pro Quo Principle, the Authorship Principle, and the Public
Domain Principle). The Necessary and Proper Clause does not undermine these
limits because it cannot be used to "adopt measures which are prohibited by the
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Clause interaction is currently under attack by the anti-circumvention
provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act9O and proposed
database protection statutes.9 1 Congress' increase of the copyright
term is under attack as violative of the "limited times" provision. 92
Another issue which seems over-ripe for litigation is the intersection
between Constitutional/Congressional policy and state-based legal
rights, including contractual expansion of AERs and IERs.93
In sum, the Court has yet to enforce the negative implication of the
Progress Clause,9 4 but the pressure to do so is rising.95 To enforce
this limit, the Court will need a definition of "progress." This Article
posits "spread."
Constitution" or "pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the
government." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 423 (1819). But see Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (providing that Copyright Term Ex-
tension Act of 1998 would be constitutional under the Necessary and Proper
Clause even if, arguendo, it was beyond the scope of the Progress Clause), cert.
granted (Feb. 19, 2002) (U.S. No. 01-618). The Treaty Power does not allow by
pass of the Progress Clause limits. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 36, at 1181-
1182. The First Amendment also trumps the Treaty Power. See Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312 (1988) (refusing to allow counselor treaty to permit limit First
Amendment rights).
90. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, P.L. 105-304; see also Brief of Prof. Julie Co-
hen et al., Universal City Studios v. Remeides (Argument sections II, III), availa-
ble at http://jurist.law.pitt.eduamicus/universal_v_reimerdes_cohen.htm#II
(visited Aug. 4, 2001). But see Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d
Cir. 2001), Nov. 28, 2001, affg sub nom., Universal Studios v. Remeides (denying
multiple constitutional challenges on the DMCA as applied to injunction against
posting on the Internet hyperlinks to or text of DeCSS decryption software for
decoding DVD movies).
91. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: the Role
of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Informa-
tion, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2000) (discussing problems with proposed stat-
utes); Pollack supra note 21, (same).
92. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir., 2001), cert. granted sub nom. Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1062 (2002).
93. I have argued that the states should be limited by the Progress Clause. See Pol-
lack supra note 1, at 300-26. The Court has said otherwise. See Goldstein v.
California, 416 U.S. 470, 560-61 (1983); Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470, 478-79 (1974).
94. Preemption cases routinely invoke the federal statutes as central, if not totally
determinative. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Co., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Inc., 376
U.S. 234 (1964).
95. The Court expressly declined to reach the Progress Clause's limitation on trade
dress protection of product configurations covered by expired utility patents. See
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001).
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C. How the Suggested Reading Fits the Constitutional
Scheme
1. Originalism
No matter how good my empirical research, I would not expect an-
yone to accept my analysis if it was incongruent with basic principles
held by the Federalists who drafted and ratified the Constitution.
This section briefly demonstrates that my reading of the Progress
Clause makes sense inside the Federalist belief structure. I am not, of
course, claiming that mine is the only reading of the Progress Clause
congruent with Federalist principles. A stronger claim is impossible.
"Federalist principles" is an umbrella name, a short hand designation,
for the differing, inconsistent, often: incompletely analyzed beliefs held
by a multitude of human beings who cooperated in supporting ratifica-
tion of a political document.
First, according to Enlightenment Idea of Progress theorists, wide
dissemination of information was a requirement for qualitative im-
provement of arts and sciences. Any subgroup of humans, any nation,
might stagnate or regress. Mankind as a whole would "progress" be-
cause of the large number of individuals who would have the opportu-
nity to add onto what earlier individuals had learned.96 Writing,
therefore, was very important. Committing information to a lasting,
mobile format allowed more people to share and build on earlier
work.97 This, presumably, is why AERs are only allowable for
"writings."9 8
Second, according to both Enlightenment Idea of Progress theorists
and many of the Framers, relative equality of all humans was part of
the perfect society. According to Condorcet, "Our hopes for the future
condition of the human race can be subsumed under three important
heads; the abolition of inequality between nations, the progress of
equality within each nation, and the true perfection of mankind."99
This true perfection includes universal education.30 0 "All men," after
96. See CONDORCET, SKETCH FOR A HISTORICAL PICTURE OF THE PROGRESS OF THE
Hrmi Mm-D 33, 38, 42, 73-76, 92-93, 99-106, 117-20, 136-40, 164, 171, 186-88
(June Barraclough trans, Noonday Press, New York, n.d.) (1795); Turgot, On
Universal History, in TURGOT ON PROGRESS, SOCIOLOGY AND EcoNoBucs 61, 116-
18 (Ronald L. Meek trans. & ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1973).
97. See CONDORCEr, supra note 96, at 76; Turgot, supra note 96, at 117-18; see also
James Beattie, The Theory of Language, in DISSERTATIONS MORAL AND CRICAL
231, 318 (Friedrich Frommann Verlag 1970 facsimile of 1783 ed.) ("Of the useful-
ness of Printing, as the means of multiplying books without end, of promoting the
improvement of arts and sciences, and of diffusing knowledge through all the
classes of mankind, I need not enlarge, as the thing is too obvious to require
illustration.").
98. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) ("fixed in any tangible medium").
99. CoNDoRcET, supra note 96, at 173.
100. See id. at 182-84.
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all, "are created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain ina-
lienable rights" including the "pursuit of happiness"'10 which requires
intelligent, educated choice. General public education was a common,
central tenet.10 2 Even the Bill of Rights created institutions for teach-
ing governance skills to the general public.10 3
As Madison famously said, "[klnolwledge will forever govern igno-
rance"; "[a] popular government without popular information[ ] or the
means of acquiring it is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy or per-
haps both."304 Madison, nevertheless, argued that the Constitution
101. See Declaration of Independence. Garry Wills reads Jefferson's words as invok-
ing the moral sense philosophy of Francis Hutchinson in which the "pursuit of
happiness" involved constant attention to what was good for human society. See
GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
250-55 (1978); see also John Adams, Thoughts on Government: Applicable to the
Present State of the American Colonies, in 4 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE WORKS
OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES WITH A LIFE OF THE
AUTHOR 189, 193 (1851) ("[Tlhe happiness of society is the end of government";
"the happiness of man, as well as his dignity, consists in virtue."). But see Gordon
S. Wood, Heroics, in N.Y. REV. 16-18 (Apr. 2, 1981) (disputing thesis that the
Declaration of Independence invokes Hutchinson specifically, without disputing
the Declaration's foundation in moral sentiment theory). See also FORREST MC-
DONALD, Novus ORDo SECLORUM 53-55 (1985) (listing several different 18th cen-
tury meanings of "equal," most of which allowed slavery).
102. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at
72, 120, 426, 570 (1998 paperback ed.) (1969). Many state constitutions men-
tioned public education. See GA. CONS. (1777) Art. LIV; MASS. CONS. (1780), ch.
V, § II; N.C. CONS. (1776) LXI; N.H. CONS. (1784); PA. CONS. (1776) § 44; see also
ADAMS, supra note 101, at 199 ("Laws for the liberal education of youth, espe-
cially of the lower class of people, are so extremely wise and useful, that to a
humane and generous mind, no expense for this purpose would be thought ex-
travagant."); Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles of the
Federal Constitution, by a Citizen of America, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE
1787-1788, at 25, 65 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1888, Da Capo Press reprint ed.
1968) ("[LWiberty stands on the immovable basis of a general distribution of prop-
erty and diffusion of knowledge.").
103. See AKIL REED AmAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS xii (1998) (arguing that Bill of Rights
involved "protection of various intermediate associations-church, militia, and
jury-designed to create an educated and virtuous electorate").
104. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Berry (Aug. 4, 1822), in JAMES MADISON, THE
COMPLETE MADISON 337 (Saul KL Padover ed. 1953). A "gentleman from Rhode
Island" was quoted in the Pennsylvania Gazette for similar sentiments:
Tyrants are the only enemies of literature, and ignorance and slavery go
hand in hand. Nothing but the general diffusion of knowledge will ever
lead us to adopt or support proper forms of government-for the weak
and absurd constitutions are, like slavery, the offspring of ignorance.
Nor does learning benefit government alone; agriculture, the basis of our
national wealth and manufactories, owe all their modern improvements
to it.
Letter from a gentleman of Rhode Island, June 7, 1787, printed in PENN. GA-
ZETTE, June 20, 1787, Accessible Archives Item no. 73991) (emphasis added).
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did not need a Bill of Rights.105 Presumably, he thought the Progress
Clause was not a danger to the public's ability to acquire knowledge.
This may be because "progress" meant "spread," i.e. distribution. Cer-
tainly the tension between the First Amendment and the Progress
Clause is tamed by my reading of "progress.'1o
The Framers' infamous focus on preserving unequal private prop-
erty 07 does not undermine my argument. Some have argued that
Madison, among other Framers, believed authors had a natural right
to copyright protection.1 0 This argument, however, overlooks the
limited quasi-property right such Framers seemingly supported. Be-
sides the much narrower scope of both copyright and patent in English
law at the time, we have contemporaneous statements to that effect by
influential persons. Both Francis HutchinsonlO9 and John Wither-
105. See THE FEDERALIST No. 38 (James Madison); see also id. No. 84 (Alexander
Hamilton) ("For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no
power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press
shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be
imposed?").
106. Even without this gloss on original language, many scholars have placed dissemi-
nation at the center of copyright theory. See, e.g., PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra
note 69. As Eileen Kane has suggested in conversation, dissemination's central-
ity is also supported by the disclosure requirement for patents, 35 U.S.C. § 112.
107. See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE Lm=rs OF AmRICAN CONSTI-
TuTIONALIsM: THE MADIsoNIAN FRAEwoRK AD ITS LEGACY 3 (paperback ed.
1994) (1990). Furthermore, in the proto-United States "[t]he rich and the poor
[were] not so far removed from each other as they [were] in Europe." J. HECTOR
ST. JOHN DE CREVECOEuR, LETTERS FROM AN A&imcAN FRiuER 41 (Susan Man-
ning ed., Oxford Univ. Press paperback 1997). The Framers were proud of this
relative equality and implied that they intended to preserve it. See Webster,
supra note 102, at 59 ("Ageneral and tolerably equal distribution of landed prop-
erty is the whole basis of national freedom .... ."); see also 2 HENRY HoME, LORD
KAms, SKETCHES OF THE HISTORY OF MAN 326 (Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhan-
dlung Hildesheim 1968 facsimile of 2d ed., 1778) (1775) ("No cause hitherto men-
tioned hath such influence in depressing patriotism, as inequality of rank and
riches in an opulent monarchy."). See also McDonald, supra note 101, at 87-93
(discussing the ideological tie between republicanism and relatively equal prop-
erty in early period of revolution); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE
AzMEERICAN REVOLUTION 170-72 (Vintage paperback ed. 1993) (1992) (asserting
that white, male residents of North American colonies valued the absence of ex-
treme property disparities).
108. See Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Posses-
sion, 51 Omo ST. L.J. 517, 529 (1990) (relying on Madison's comment in Federal-
ist). But see infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text (discounting importance
of Federalist squib). The natural rights claim can also be supported by the Com-
mittee Report which led the Continental Congress to suggest the states pass
copyright legislation, see infra note 147.
109. Francis Hutchinson seems to have had major influence in colonial North America
both through his writings and through influential educator-ministers who fol-
lowed his philosophy, such as John Witherspoon in New Jersey and Francis Al-
lison in Pennsylvania. See David Fate Norton, Francis Hutchinson in America,
in STUDmS ON VOLTAIRE AND THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1547-68 (Theodore
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spoon 1 0 taught that an inventor has a natural right to reasonable
compensation for his efforts, but does not have any right to hoard his
learning if such reasonable compensation is available."1 The Feder-
alist asserts that the rights of inventors and authors stand on the
same logical premises. 112
2. An Evolving Constitution
Allowing the meaning of "progress" to evolve results in the same
reading of the Progress Clause as using the original meaning of the
word "progress." Both methods converge on "spread" as the meaning
of "progress"; both, therefore, construe the Progress Clause to allow
only such private property as helps the dissemination of science and
the useful arts." 3 Let me explain.
Besterman ed., 1976) (Transactions of the Fourth International Congress on the
Enlightenment, Voltaire Foundation at the Taylor Institution, Oxford); see also
WILLS, supra note 101; Wood, supra note 101.
110. John Witherspoon may have been "the most influential religious and educational
leader in Revolutionary America." Thomas Miller, Preface, in JOHN WITHER-
SPOON, THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN WITHERSPOON vii, vii (Thomas Miller
ed., 1990). Witherspoon was professor and President of the College of New
Jersey, which became Princeton University. James Madison was one of his fa-
mous students. Witherspoon was the only clergyman to sign the Declaration of
Independence, was a member of the Continental Congress, founded the American
Presbyterian Church, and stumped in favor of the 1787 federal Constitution. See
id. at vii; Miller, Introduction, in id. at 27-31 (1990).
111. John Witherspoon taught that "the public" has certain rights over every person in
society. Society may demand that each person be useful, and has "a right to the
discovery of useful inventions, provided an adequate price be paid to the discov-
erer." John Witherspoon, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, in id. at 152, 228. Garry
Wills interprets similarly the following language in Hutchinson. See WILLS,
supra note 101:
A like right we may justly assert to mankind as a system, and to every
society of men, even before civil government, to compel any person who
has fallen upon any fortunate invention, of great necessity or use for the
preservation of life or for a great increase of human happiness, to divulge
it upon reasonable terms.
2 FRANCIS HUTCHINSON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 109 (1755).
As a man cannot hoard useful ideas, he cannot destroy his own property
if it is still useful to the community.
FRANCIS HUTCHINSON, A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 246-47
(1747).
112. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (Madison, quoted infra note 161).
113. Using a completely different route, Margaret Chon reaches the same definition
for the "post-modern progress" she wishes Congress to promote with intellectual
property grants. See Chon, supra note 66, at 146 ("The project of the patent and
copyright clause must be understood as access to knowledge, which is a type of
property and civil right."). See also Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Roman-
tic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age 29, 31 (Nov.
2001) (Working Paper on file with author) (using Roman law categories of res
publicae and res divinijuris to explain importance of sharing intellectual works).
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If the "progress" we want Congress to promote is the latest, most
evolved meaning of "progress," we should not turn back to the nine-
teenth century "Idea of Progress." As post-moderns we know, of
course, that a poll of the current common use of the word "progress"
would result in a useless cacophony. The language in the Constitution
has been removed from every day speech and imbued with an almost
religious aura. Certainly the aura is too overpowering, too vague, and
too disputed for this type of simplistic empirical research to be an ac-
ceptable method of defining legal limitations.
We have, however, a very simple way of determining the modern
meaning of "progress." At its core, the post-Renaissance concept of
progress is the claim that humans will change over time into more
knowledgeable residents of a better society. To modernize "progress,"
therefore, we can ask how "We, The People of the United States"114
improved our fundamental charter, the Constitution. What did We
enact as constitutional "progress"?
"We, the People" changed the Constitution to allow more of us to be
part of "We, the People." This conclusion does not require any subjec-
tive evaluation. Just look at the Amendments to the Constitution.115
The first ten can be viewed in two different ways. First, they are part
of the original document because the Constitution would not have
been ratified without a promise to enact them; they are merely part of
the baseline before we look for change. Alternatively, they protect in-
dividual citizens against the power of the newly created federal gov-
ernment.116 Either view is consistent with my thesis.
As for the other Amendments, the general trend is an increase in
participation by more individual citizens. In 1804, the Twelfth
Amendment separates out the votes for President and Vice President
to allow the viability of the political party; a pooling of resources al-
114. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
115. Court made doctrine is imposed on "We, the people." It also tends to oscillate. I,
therefore, hesitate to rely on it here. One major change, however, seems both
irrevokable and strongly supports my thesis. The Incorporation of most of the
Bill of Rights against the States recognizes that these government units have
become large enough to become oppressive. Incorporation gives more power to
the people. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CoNsTrrUTION IN THE COuRTs: LAW OR
PoLmcs? 140 (1994) (asserting that incorporation "is a fixed feature of the Amer-
ican constitutional law: indeed, it has become a constitutive feature of modem
American government.... It is not surprising, therefore, that today few persons
are interested in challenging the application to the states of those Bill of Rights
provisions on which it has relied in striking down state action."). But see RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORNTATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMEND iENT 155-198 (2d ed. 1997) (attacking allegations that Congress intended
to incorporate any of the Bill of Rights against the states when drafting the Four-
teenth Amendment).
116. Part of this protection is protecting the intermediate protector, the State. Under
this reading, the Eleventh Amendment might be read to support my thesis. It
protects the financial viability of States.
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lowing some groups to overcome collective action problems.'1 7 1865
through 1870 give us the Reconstruction Amendments ending slavery,
giving former slaves the vote, and starting the process of forcing the
rest of "We, the People" to treat African-Americans with equality. In
1913, the Sixteenth Amendment allows the direct federal income
tax-a democratization of the cost of government."18 Amendment
Seventeen makes the election of Senators more direct. In 1920, the
Nineteenth Amendment gives women the right to vote. Sections one
and two of the Twentieth Amendment enhance popular control of Con-
gress by severely limiting the power of lame-duck members.1 19 The
Twenty-Second Amendment creates a term limit for the Presidency.
In 1961, the Twenty-Third Amendment finally allows the residents of
the District of Columbia to vote for President and Vice President. The
Twenty-Fourth Amendment, in 1964, outlaws the poll tax as a method
of curtailing the right to vote. In 1971, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
lowers the voting age to eighteen. In 1992, the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment restrains the power of Senators and Representatives to
raise their own salaries without electoral feedback.
Some of these changes are minor. Some are major. All however
are part of an ongoing movement towards allowing more people to
have more power over their government. "We, the people," therefore,
have demonstrated unequivocally that "progress" in "promoting the
general welfare"120 means spread, dissemination, sharing of power.
In sum, if we want to find an evolved meaning for "progress," we
can look at the evolution of the Constitution. Constitutional "Pro-
gress" means sharing, spreading, disseminating the power. "Pro-
gress," therefore, means "spread." The Progress Clause, thus, allows
Congress to create individual rights to exclude only when those rights
promote the spread of science and the useful arts. The explanation is
117. See, e.g., JAMES A. HENRETrA, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1700-1815:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY SrUDY 221 (paperback ed., D. C. Heath & Co. 1973) (1973)
(explaining that ideologically disparate political parties were institutions for ena-
bling larger percentage of population to have some political power).
118. See ROBERT A. BECKER, REVOLUTION, REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN
TAXATION, 1763-1783, at 6-7 (1980) (pointing out that early tax systems
overburdened the poor and the politically impotent in relation to the rich and
powerful).
119. The original Constitution did not seat new members until the following Decem-
ber. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 2. The interaction of this provision with the date
of the national election and Congressional procedures left a long period of lame-
duck control. If the Electoral College threw the Presidential or Vice Presidential
choice into the Congress, the lame-duck Congress decided on the next executive.
See S. REP. 72-26 (1932), reprinted in 75 CONG. REC. 1372-73. The latter dis-
agreements between the House and the Senate were on the exact dates various
officials took office, not on the underlying desire to enhance government respon-
siveness to general elections. See 75 CONG. REc. 5026-27 (1932).
120. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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supported by the undoubted dependence of political decision making
on access to information. If more people are involved in governing,
more people need to be informed; information needs to be spread
throughout the politically empowered population.
II. STARTING POINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS FOR
TEXTUAL ANALYSIS
Constitutional construction is generally divisible into four meth-
ods: (a) asking what the words meant when enacted, (b) asking the
intent of the drafters or ratifiers of the language at issue, (c) asking
how the principles of the drafters or ratifiers counsel us to act in the
present case requiring decision, and (d) asking how modern principles
counsel us to act in the present case requiring decision.121 The last
two methods often involve using modern definitions of amorphous
words such as "reasonable" or "due process."'122 As discussed in the
next section, original intent, choice (b), seems unavailable for lack of
evidence.' 23 Choices (c) and (d) founder on the lack of consensus.
Both now and in 1789, people disagree about both the correct baseline
and the empirical outcome of different protection levels.124 If we wish
121. Functional or structural analysis are variations of these stances. For example,
Alden v. Maine, 527 US 706, 712-26 (1999), posits a non-textual limit on federal
power based on the ratifying generation's alleged assumptions about sovereign
entities, i.e. a variation of approaches (b) and (c).
122. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 202 (1971) (providing that due
process limits on jury instructions "reflect the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society") (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); id. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (providing that "the wooden position
of the Court, reflected in today's decision, cannot be reconciled with the evolving
gloss of civilized standards" which the Supreme Court has long read into the "pro-
cedural due process safeguards of the Bill of Rights"); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 183 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (providing that "due process is an
evolving concept" requiring "that old principles [be] subject[ed] to re-evaluation
in light of later experience").
123. As usual, some exceptions exist. Hopefully, the history of the Statute of Anne
should lead us to refuse to use copyright to empower censorship; a choice also
compelled by the modern view of the First Amendment's speech and press
clauses. The history of the Statute of Monopolies counsels us to refuse to allow
government use of copyright or patent for indirect funding of government func-
tions. See Malla Pollack, supra note 39, at 116-140 (making this argument while
admitting that the courts have not taken this position).
124. "[Nlothing is more properly a man's own than the fruit of his study" according to
a 1783 report joined by James Madison. 24 JouRNALs OF THE CON uNTAL CON-
GRESs 326 (1783), available at http'J/memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/
lawhome.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2001). Thomas Jefferson, however, wrote:
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of ex-
clusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea ....
Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because
every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me,
receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his
taper at mine, receives light without darkening me .... Inventions then
20011
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:754
to convince disparate others, therefore, we are left with only method
(a), Original Meaning. Original Meaning also has the virtue of cur-
rent Supreme Court approval.i 2 5
Completely rejecting the original meaning approach as to this par-
ticular constitutional clause, furthermore, would seriously upset cur-
rent practice. "Writings" has been expanded to include two and three
dimensional art objects and music.i 2 6 Under original meaning analy-
sis, this move is easily supportable. "Author" in eighteenth century
English was a very broad term. "God" was commonly described as the
"author" of the physical world.' 27 The physical world was a text in
which man could read divine messages congruent with those in the
Scriptures, God's verbal text.' 28 Do we wish to cancel copyright pro-
tection of art and music? Do we wish to admit the level of inconsis-
tency required to use an eighteenth century definition of "author," yet
insist on a mid-nineteenth century definition of "progress"? I suggest
that all interpreters of the Constitution admit that we should at least
start construction of the Progress Clause with late eighteenth century
word use.
To make any headway, even under Original Meaning theory, I
need to make several assumptions. All are reasonable, but all are
merely assumptions.
cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society may give an exclusive
right to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men to
pursue ideas, which may produce utility.
Letter to Isaac McPherson (813), in VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 180-
81 (Washington ed.) (cited in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8-9 n.2
(1966)).
125. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 734.
126. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
127. See, e.g., JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN MILTON
1, 173 (Oxford University Press ed., 1961) ("Author of all this thou seest.").
Milton describes Satan as "author' of his children, Sin and Death, and as "author
and prime architect" of the bridge Sin and Death build between hell and earth.
Id. at 219, 222 (Book X, 11. 236, 356). See also JONATHAN BOUCHER, A View of the
Causes and Consequences of the American Revolution, in THIRTEEN DISOURSES,
PREACHED IN NORTH AMERICA BETWEEN THE YEARS 1763 AND 1755, WITH AN HIS-
TORICAL PREFACE 485 (Russell & Russell photo reprint, 1967) (1797) (referring to
Satan as the "first author and founder of rebellion"); THoMAS BURNET, THE SA-
CRED THEORY OF THE EARTH 26 (Centaur Press photo. reprint, 1965) (2d ed. 1691)
(referring to God as the "author" of both human "Reason" and the "Sacred writ-
ings."). But see E.C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, (forthcoming Spring 2002) (on file
with author) (arguing that "writings" in Clause bears narrow meaning because it
invokes narrower of meanings for "author" in Samuel Johnson's 1755 dictionary,
"the first writer of anything; a writer in general").
128. See, e.g., FRANCIS BACON, THE ADvANCEMENT OF LFRINING 9 (Oxford University
Press ed., 2000) (1605) ("[LIet no man... maintaine, that a man can search too
farre, or bee too well studied in the Booke of Gods word, or in the Booke of Gods
workes.").
THE PROGRESS CLAUSE
First, I will assume that the words of the Progress Clause were
carefully chosen for substantive reasons.1 29 As discussed below, the
wording does not follow any of the suggestions made at the 1787 Con-
stitutional Convention. It does not quote any ancestral document.
Perhaps the drafting committee merely considered the sound of the
words. I will assume, however, that the committee purposefully chose
words that were not legal terms of art. I will assume that the commit-
tee chose these words because of what they meant.
Second, I will assume that the Progress Clause contains no sur-
plusage. Eighteenth century authorities on style demanded brevity
and clarity.130 The no surplusage rule is a time tested canon of statu-
tory construction.131 I admit that the Court has been known to be less
kind to constitutional language.' 3 2 The Court, however, usually gives
intent-related reasons for such lapses.13 3 Intent, however, is too
murky in this instance to be a useful tool for someone who wishes to
persuade.
129. But see LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAjERS' CoNsTrruTION 179
(1988) (asserting that Framers were not careful draftsmen).
130. See John Witherspoon, Lectures on Eloquence, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN
WITHERSPOON 231, 245, 272, 291 (Thomas Miller ed., 1990) (insisting on brevity
and clarity). '"Ihefirst rule for promoting the strength of a sentence is, to prune it
of all redundant words and members." LIND=EY MuRRAY, ENGLISH GRAMMAR 200
(Scolar Press Ltd. photo. reprint) (1795) (emphasis in original). See also id. at
191 ("All unmeaning words, introduced merely to round the period, or fill up the
melody, are great blemishes in writing. They are childish and puerile ornaments,
but which a sentence always loses more in point of weight, than it can gain by
such additions to its sound"). Murray's grammar was "without doubt the most
popular and frequently reprinted grammar of English during the nineteenth cen-
tury" and very popular in the United States. Id. at n.p. (editor's note before fac-
simile of original title page).
131. See, e.g, TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 24 (2001) ("It is a cardinal principle
of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed
that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,
void, or insignificant") (internal quotation marks omitted); Platt v. Union Pac.
R.R., 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 48, 58 (1878) (mem.) ("[A] legislature is assumed to have
used no superfluous words"). But see Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 122 S.
Ct. 528, 532 (2001) (admitting that Court's interpretation of statute renders some
words mere surplusage, but asserting that "no other reasonable reading of the
statute" is possible).
132. See Board ofTrustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,363 (2000) (admitting that Court's
case law oversteps the language of the Eleventh Amendment); Maryland v. Craig,
497 U.S. 836, 870 (1990) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (asserting that majority opinion
"gives the defendant virtually everything the Confrontation Clause guarantees
(everything, that is, except confrontation)").
133. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890) (refusing to follow literal reading of
the Eleventh Amendment because allowing a citizen to sue his own state in fed-
eral court is "a construction never imagined or dreamed of' when the Eleventh
Amendment was adopted or when Constitution was established); Craig, 497 U.S.
at 845 (discussing "central concern of the Confrontation Clause" in light of histor-
ical practices it rejected).
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Third, I will assume that the word "progress" has the same mean-
ing as to the discoveries of inventors as it does regarding the writings
of authors.' 3 4 The parallel construction of the Progress Clause im-
plies this conclusion. At least one leading scholar, however, argues
that "commerce" may have a different meaning in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3 when applied to "commerce among the several states" than
when applied to commerce "with foreign nations." 35 That argument,
however, claims an original intent basis for the distinction and admits
that, absent an original intent record, the default position should be to
give a word the same meaning throughout.
Before I discuss "progress," I need to provide 1789 definitions for
some of the other words in the Clause. "Useful arts" are the techno-
logical arts, as opposed to the liberal arts.' 36 In the eighteenth cen-
tury, "science" included all knowledge and all subjects of organized
study.'3 7
With this background, we are prepared to construe the word
'progress."
III. DRAFTING AND RATIFICATION
The standard explicative sources from the constitutional drafting
and ratification process are not helpful in defining "progress" as used
in the Progress Clause.
First, the historical precursors of the Progress Clause do not use
the same language. The English 1624 Statute of Monopolies' 3 S ("Stat-
134. But see Birnhack, supra note 66, at 16-17 (arguing that "copyright law is best
understood in terms of intellectual progress, while patent law is best understood
in terms of material progress."). Larry Lessig, in email conversation, raised the
possibility that Congress has the powers to "promote the progress of science" and
"to promote the useful arts." While possible, this reading strains my sense of
eighteenth century parallelism. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 332-33 (1816) (discussing similar parallelism issue in article II, sec-
tion 2). Furthermore, "useful arts" is a common eighteenth century phrase, while
"progress of science" is not.
135. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CH.
L. REV. 101, 144-45 (2001).
136. See NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, at un-
numbered page headed "ARR - ARS - ART" (Foundation for American Christian
Education photo. reprint, 1998) (1828) (stating within second definition of "art"
that "[airts are divided into useful or mechanic and liberal or polite."). See also
Coulter, supra note 80, at 494-99 (1952); Pollack, supra note 78, at 86-119;
Thomas, supra note 80, at 1169-75.
137. See WEBSTER, supra note 136, at unnumbered page headed SCI-SCI-SLA ("SCI-
ENCE, n.... (1) In a general sense ... knowledge ... (2) In philosophy, a collec-
tion of the general principles or leading truths relating to any subject.... (3) Art
derived from precepts or built on principles... (4) Any art or species of knowl-
edge.... (5) One of the seven liberal branches of knowledge, viz. grammar, logic,
rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music").
138. 21 Jam., ch. 3 (1624) (Eng.).
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ute") is the recognized ancestor of American utility patents. 139 This
Statute was an early Parliamentary attempt to limit monarchial
power by preventing royal access to revenue sources unguarded by
Parliament.140 The Statute opens by banning all legal claims of "mo-
nopoly,"141 but excepts from this general ban certain privileges
granted to "the first and true inventor" of any "new manufacture."142
The Statute does not mention anything akin to "progress." The pur-
pose preamble discusses only preventing harm to the public from im-
proper grants.14 3 The English Statute of Anne' 44 ("Anne") is the
acknowledged ancestor of American copyright statutes.14 5 Anne is la-
beled "An act for the encouragement of learning" and declares that it
is enacted both to prevent "printers, booksellers and other persons"
from printing books "without the consent of the authors or proprie-
tors" and "for the encouragement of learned men to compose and write
useful books."146 Anne does foreshadow the Progress Clause's as-
sumption that legal control creates monetary rewards which, in turn,
may provide a motive for publishing books. The word "progress," how-
ever, is absent.
During the Articles of Confederation period, a committee of the
Continental Congress did submit a report requesting the member
states to pass copyright statutes. Twelve enacted such statutes.
Neither the committee report nor the statutes, however, mention the
"progress" of technology, learning, knowledge, science, or
literature.14 7
139. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
140. See CHARLEs HowARD McILwAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM ANcIENT AND MODERN 138
(1940) (characterizing Statute as first win by Parliament in its fight against abso-
lute monarchy). But see Chris R. Kyle, 'But a New Button to an Old Coat'. The
Enactment of the Statute of Monopolies, 21 James I chap. 3, 19 J. LEGAL HIsT. 203
(1998) (arguing that Statute was enacted with James rs cooperation).
141. "Monopoly" in the 1624 statute is a vague pejorative term. See Pollack, supra
note 39, at 40 & n.221.
142. 21 Jam., ch. 3, §§ V-VI (1624) (Eng.) (regarding existing and future grants).
143. 21 Jam., ch. 3 § I (1624) (Eng.) (stating that "upon Misinformations, and untrue
Pretences of publick Good" persons have obtained illegal grants "to the great
Grievance and Inconvenience of your Majesty's Subjects").
144. 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
145. See, e.g., PAuL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 1.13.1, at 1:27 (2d ed. 2000).
146. 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710) (Eng.).
147. The committee, consisting of Mr. [Hugh] Williamson, Mr. [Ralph] Izard
and Mr. [James] Madison, to whom were referred sundry papers and me-
morials from different persons on the subject of literary property, being
persuaded that nothing is more properly a man's own than the fruit of
his study, and that the protection and security of literary property would
greatly tend to encourage genius, to promote useful discoveries and to
the general extension of arts and commerce, beg leave to submit the fol-
lowing report:
Resolved, That it be recommended to the several states, to secure to the
authors or publishers of any new books not hitherto printed, being citi-
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The word "progress" does appear in the preambles to the almost
identical Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island statutes:
Whereas the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization, the pub-
lic weal of the community, and the advancement of human happiness, greatly
depend on the efforts of learned and ingenious persons in the various arts and
sciences .... 148
"Progress" is not tied to "knowledge"; it is tied to "civilization." This
phrase may easily mean that civilization is to spread geographically
and throughout the population-hardly an odd thought considering
how little of the available land had been settled by Europeans and
how many niceties of society were confined to large settlements with
water transport 14 9 This geographic reading of "the progress of civili-
zens of the United States, and to their heir or assigns executors, admin-
istrators and assigns, the copyright of such books for a certain time, not
less than fourteen years from the first publication; and to secure to the
said authors, if they shall survive the term first mentioned, and to their
heirs or assigns executors, administrators and assigns, the copyright of
such books for another term of time not less than fourteen years, such
copy or exclusive right of printing, publishing and vending the same, to
be secured to the original authors, or publishers, or their assigns their
executors, administrators and assigns, by such laws and under restric-
tions as to the several states may seem proper.
24 JOURNALs OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 326-27 (Friday, May 2, 1783), avail-
able at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlawAawhome.html (last visited Aug. 4,
2001). For full text of all copyright statutes passed by the states during the Arti-
cles of Confederation period, see Copyright Office, Library of Congress, Copyright
Enactments: Laws Passed in the United States Since 1783 Relating to Copyright,
3 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. (rev. ed. 1963); see also id. at 140 (providing the text of
1672 enactment of the Massachusetts Bay Colony forbidding any printer from
printing more copies of any book than agreed to by the "outer of the said coppie or
coppies").
148. An Act for the Purpose of Securing to Authors the Exclusive Right and Benefit of
Publishing Their Literary Productions, for Twenty-One Years (enacted Mar. 17,
1783) reprinted in id., at 4-5. The New Hampshire statute of Nov. 7, 1783 opens
with almost identical language:
As the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization, and the
advancement of human happiness, greatly depend on the efforts of inge-
nious persons in the various arts and sciences...
An Act for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius, and for securing to au-
thors the exclusive right and benefit of publishing their literary productions, for
twenty years, reprinted in id. at 8. The Rhode Island statute enacted in the De-
cember session of 1783 opens:
Whereas the improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization, the
public weal of the community, and the advancement of human happi-
ness, greatly depend on the efforts of learned and ingenious persons, in
the various arts and sciences ... "
An Act for the Purpose of securing to authors the exclusive right and benefit of
publishing their literary productions for twenty-one years, reprinted in id. at 9.
149. Colonizing a new continent necessarily involved discovering new knowledge.
"Perhaps never before in a civilized country had physical and intellectual expan-
sion been so clearly synonymous" as in colonial North America. DANIEL J. BOOR-




zation" is congruent with the vording of the then-current constitution
of the state of Massachusetts.
Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body
of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties;
and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of educa-
tion in the various parts of the country, and among the different orders of the
people, it shall be the duty of this commonwealth to cherish the interests of
literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially the univer-
sity at Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools in the towns; to en-
courage private societies and public institutions, rewards and immunities, for
the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures,
and a natural history of the country; to countenance and inculcate the princi-
ples of humanity and general benevolence, public and private charity, indus-
try and frugality, honesty, and punctuality in their dealings; sincerity, good
humor, and all social affections, and generous sentiments among the
people. 150
This passage is repeated almost verbatim in the New Hampshire state
constitution;15 1 it is slightly echoed in the Rhode Island Constitu-
tion.' 5 2 Similarly, four of these early copyright statutes assert that
150. MASS. CoNsT. of 1780, ch. 5, § 2, reprinted in PHILLIP B. KuniAn & RALPH LER-
NER, 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONsTrrUTioN 39 (1987). The 1780 Massachusetts Consti-
tution is based on a draft composed by John Adams. See Louis ADAMs
FROTHINGHAM, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF MAS-
sACHUSETTS WiTH A CHAPTER ON LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 25-27 (1916). This sub-
section appears to have been drafted completely by John Adams and enacted as
suggested without negative comment. See ADnAis, supra note 101, at 259 n.1 at
261 (1851) ("I was somewhat apprehensive that criticism and objections would be
made to the section, and particularly that the "natural history" and the "good
humor" would be stricken out; but the whole was received very kindly, and
passed the convention unanimously, without amendment") (allegedly quoting an
1809 statement by John Adams).
151. Knowledge and learning, generally diffused through a community, being
essential to the preservation of a free government; and spreading the
opportunities and advantages of education through the various parts of
the country, being highly conductive to promote this end; it shall be the
duty of this government to cherish the interest of literature and the sci-
ences, and all seminaries and public schools, to encourage the promotion
of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures and natu-
ral history of the country...
N.H. CONST. of 1784, reprinted in 6 WILLI F. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND Docu-
MENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 344,355 (1975). When New Hampshire
passed its first copyright statute, it was governed by the Constitution of 1776-a
very brief document passed by the colonial legislature after the "sudden and ab-
rupt departure" of the royal governor and many of his council. Id. at 342. A new
state constitution was drafted in 1779 and presented to the voters, but it was
rejected at the polls. The suggested 1779 New Hampshire Constitution did not
contain any mention of knowledge or learning. See 11 ToWN PAPERS 741-45 (Is-
sac W. Hammond ed., 1882).
152. Rhode Island remained governed by the royal charter creating the colony until
1842. See 8 SwINDLER, supra note 151, at 340 (editorial note); id. at 363 (re-
printing Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations issued 1663 by
Charles II of England). The 1842 Rhode Island Constitution recites diffusion of
knowledge as the basis for requiring public schools. R.I. CoNsT. art. XII § 1, re-
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new works help "mankind,"'5 3 and five make provision for overriding
the author's privilege if he fails to make sufficient copies of his work
available locally at reasonable prices.i54
In summation, eight of the twelve pre-U.S. Constitution copyright
statutes officially endorse the spread of knowledge.
At the 1787 Constitutional Convention, delegates voiced several
relevant suggestions for congressional powers. "To grant to literary
authors their copy rights for a limited time."' 55 "To encourage by pre-
miums & provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and of dis-
coveries."1 56 "To grant patents for useful inventions." 57 "To secure to
Authors exclusive rights for a limited time."' 58 While several of these
suggestions rely on the concept of monetary incentive, none uses the
word "progress." Madison's notes, furthermore, do not include any
discussion of these suggestions. All we know is that the current lan-
guage of Article I, section 8, clause 8 emerged complete from commit-
tee on September 5, 1787 and was accepted with no one
contradicting.15 9
The ratification debates and related literature are unhelpful. They
barely mention the Progress Clause. No one defined the word "pro-
gress."1 60 The fullest discussion we have is Madison's short para-
graph in the Federalist Papers.'6 ' Madison claimed that, as to
printed in 8 SWINDLER, supra note 151, at 386, 395 ("The diffusion of knowledge,
as well as of virtue, among the people being essential to the preservation of their
rights and liberties, it shall be the duty of the general assembly to promote public
schools, and to adopt all means which they may deem necessary and proper to
secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education.").
153. Connecticut and New York mention "service to mankind." COPYRIGHT OFF.
BULL., supra note 147, at 1, 19. Massachusetts refers to the "benefit of mankind."
Id. at 4. New Jersey invokes the "general good of mankind." Id. at 6.
154. Connecticut, South Carolina, North Carolina, Georgia, and New York. See id. at
2-3, 13, 16, 18, 20. Massachusetts required two copies be given free to the library
of the University of Cambridge. See id. at 4-5.
155. JAMES MADISON, NOTES ON DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 480
(1966) (1787) (Madison's suggestion).
156. Id. (Madison's suggestion).
157. Id. (Pinkney's suggestion).
158. Id. (Pinkney's suggestion). Pinkney also suggested "To establish seminaries for
the promotion of literature and the arts & sciences" and "To establish public in-
stitutions, rewards and immunities for the promotion of agriculture, trades, and
manufactures." Id.
159. Id. at 580-81.
160. See Pollack, supra note 39, at 99-116 (discussing mentions of the Progress Clause
during the ratification process); Walterscheid, supra note 69, at 773-74 (same).
161. THE FOURTH class comprises the following miscellaneous powers: 1. A
power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing,
for a limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries." 'The utility of this power will
scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly ad-
judged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to use-
ful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The
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patents and copyrights, "the public good fully coincides with the
claims of individuals." This seems simplistic at best. We might con-
sider Madison's words a gloss on the word "progress," but I am more
inclined to dismiss The Federalist's squib as a rapidly penned attempt
to discuss all clauses in the proposed Constitution. The Federalist
paragraph misstates then-current English law.16 2 The Federalists,
furthermore, were rather too busy replying to objections to the Consti-
tution to spend much thought on a clause whose positive grant of
power had not been attacked.16 3
In sum, while many scholars assume that the words in the Pro-
gress Clause invoke the Idea of Progress and paraphrase earlier docu-
ments, these are mere assumptions. The Progress Clause has unique
wording and comes without an official set of definitions.16 4 We must,
therefore, turn to other evidence.
public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals.
The States cannot separately make effectual provisions for either of the
cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by
laws passed at the instance of Congress.
THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison)
162. Madison implied that inventors had common law rights in their inventions, but
the eighteenth century crown had no obligation to issue any specific patent of
invention. See, e.g., Edward Armitage, Two Hundred Years of English Patent
Law, in 200 YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERIcAN PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND Copy-
RIGHT LAw 3, 4 (1976). During the reign of Elizabeth I, patents were refused for
Lee's stocking frame and Harrington's water closet. See E. Wyndham Hulme,
The History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative and at Common Law. A
Sequel., 16 L.Q. REv. 44, 53 (1900). On copyright, English law had recently
changed, perhaps without Madison's knowledge. See John F. Whicher, The Ghost
of Donaldson v. Beckett: An Inquiry into the Constitutional Distribution of Powers
over the Law of Literary Property in the United States,-Part 1, 9 BULL. Copy-
RIGHT Soc'Y U.S. 102, 133 (1961) (asserting that Madison was probably relying on
an outdated version of Blackstone).
163. See Andrew J. Reck, Moral Philosophy and the Framing of the Constitution, re-
printed in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN CONSTrru-
TION 23, 36 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1989) (stating that the
authors of the Federalist Papers were "preoccupied with the immediate task of
elucidating and defending the provisions of the Constitution against the argu-
ments of the Antifederalists.").
164. Some interpreters claim special authority for constitutional readings endorsed by
the first Congress. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 980 (1991)
(Opinion of Scalia, J.) ('The actions of the First Congress, which are of course
persuasive evidence of what the Constitution means .... .") (citations omitted).
But see id. at 1014 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe Court's jurisprudence con-
cerning the scope of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments has
long understood the limitations of a purely historical analysis.") (citations omit-
ted). Leaving aside the weight of such evidence, I have not discovered any early
congressional discussion on this specific point, let alone any group-endorsed ac-
tion. At most, we have records demonstrating a reluctance to read the Progress
Clause broadly. When one would-be explorer requested funding for an expedition
to Bafflin's Bay, Mir. Tucker "expressed a doubt whether the Legislature has
power by the Constitution to go further in rewarding the inventors of useful ma-
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IV. TESTING DEFINITIONS IN CONTEXT
The Progress Clause makes more linguistic sense when "progress"
is defined as "spread" of knowledge and technology rather than either
"qualitative improvement" or "quantitative improvement" (whether
quantity is judged numerically or by economic value).
The first problem with accepting either of these alternative defini-
tions is surplusage. If, as I have assumed, the Progress Clause con-
tains no surplusage, "promoting the progress of science and useful
arts" must mean something different from "promoting science and
useful arts."16S This alone bars both the quantity and quality
definitions.
"Quality improvement" makes the language redundant. Telling a
legislature "to promote the quality improvement of science and the
useful arts" is the same as instructing it to "to promote science and the
useful arts"; both reduce to encouraging the investment of time and
money into work in science and the useful arts. My hunt through sev-
enteenth and eighteenth century sources, furthermore, located nu-
merous usages of the shorter phase or its equivalent with this
meaning. Francis Bacon's leading book arguing the practical useful-
ness of the search for knowledge is titled The Advancement of Learn-
ing, not The Advancement of the Progress of Learning.1 6 6 Mandeville's
Fable of the Bees repeatedly refers to "promoting" arts and sciences, 167
chines, or discoveries in sciences, than merely to secure to them for a time the
right of making, publishing and vending them." 1 ANNMS OF CONGRESS 180
(April 20, 1789), at http://memory.loc.gov (last visited May 3, 2001); see also IV
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 531 (Charlene B. Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986) (reprinting
committee report stating that the request "involves an enquiry into the Constitu-
tional powers of Congress"). Some persons were concerned that "inventor" and
"discovery" might not include importers of new technology, even though such per-
sons were allowed utility patents in Great Britain. See Pollack, supra note 78, at
nn.71-78 and accompanying text.
165. But see Heath W. Hoglund, Patent Fee Diversion Crosses Constitutional Bound-
ary, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK SOC'Y 725, 725 (2001) (arguing that "Congress'
power must be exercised in a way that promotes science and technological inven-
tions," without noticing omission of "progress" from the constitutional command).
166. See BACON, supra note 128. But see SAMUEL JOHNSON, THE PLAN OF A DICTIONARY
2 (Scalar Press Ltd. photo. reprint 1970) (1747) (stating that the purpose of the
dictionary was "to promote the improvement of [his] native tongue"); Jonathan
Swift, The Bickerstaff Papers, in JONATHAN SwIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS AND
OTHER WRITINGS 455, 467 (Miriam Kosh Starkman ed., Bantam paperback 1962)
("But it seems this gentleman, instead of encouraging the progress of his own art,
is pleased to ...").
167. See, e.g., 2 BERNARD MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES: OR, PRIVATE VICES,
PUBLICK BENEFITS 43 (Clarendon Press 1924) (1714) ("I am convinced that the
Money of most rich men is laid out with the social Design of promoting Arts and
Sciences . . . ."); id. at 366 ("[O]ur pride, sloth, sensuality and fickleness are the
great patrons that promote all Arts and Sciences . . ").
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but never to "promoting the progress" of any art or science. Alexander
Hamilton's famous manufacturing group called itself the Penn-
sylvania Society for Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful
Arts,16 s not the Pennsylvania Society for the Encouragement of the
Progress of Manufactures and the Useful Arts. The Statute of Anne is
"An act for the encouragement of learning," not for "the encourage-
ment of the progress of learning." The Massachusetts and New
Hampshire Constitutions call for the "promotion of agriculture, arts,
sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures, and a natural history of
the country," not for the "promotion of the progress of agriculture,
[etc.]." Even the Continental Congress' committee report argues that
"the protection and security of literary property would greatly tend to
encourage genius [and] to promote useful discoveries";1 69 it does not
speak of "encouraging the progress of genius" or "promoting the pro-
gress of useful discoveries."X70
The quantitative definition makes "the progress of" even more
clearly redundant. What does it mean to "promote science and the
useful arts," if not to take action that will increase the quantity of
time, effort, money, or other resources devoted to "science and the use-
ful arts" so as to increase the probable output? What about an eco-
nomic interpretation of quantity? Under an economic reading,
Congress is supposed to create those rights to exclude which result in
the creation of works with the greatest total economic value. Unfortu-
nately, the economic value of a work depends on the legal rights Con-
gress creates. 17 '
168. See Announcements Concerning the Pennsylvania Society for Encouragement of
Manufacture and the Useful Arts, in 2 THEA.mRICAN MUSEUM, OR REPOSITORY OF
ANCIENT AND MODERN FUGITIVE PIECES 167.
169. JOUmALS OF THE CONTIENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 147, at 326-27.
170. See also John Milton, Paradise Regained, in JOHN MILTON, THE POETICAL WoRmS
OF JOHN MILTON 283, 290 (Helen Darbishire ed., Oxford University Press photo.
reprint 1961) (including self-description by Jesus that "my self I thought/Born to
that end, born to promote all truthJ All righteous things").
171. For example, Congress grants music composers more leverage over public per-
formances than it grants to recorded vocalists. See 17 U.S. C. § 106(5) (1996).
See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing this circularity in reference
to the CTEA); see also Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, supra note 15, at
1800 (arguing that "the assumption that 'progress' is qualitatively independent of
the underlying entitlement structure is wrong" and that protection choices influ-
ence types of works created). I would object to the economic reading on several
other grounds. I do not accept Kaldor-Hicks optimality as a suitable social goal. I
doubt that either most Framers or their generation would have adopted Kaldor-
Hicks. The federal government, for example, would have been much less expen-
sive to run with an unicameral legislature. However, one version of "progress"
theory is held by economic rationalists who conflate social improvement with in-
crease in material prosperity and generally assume that such material progress
requires a modem, liberal market. See David A. Westbrook, Law Through War,
48 BUFF. L. REV. 299, 311-13 (2000).
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As the chart on the Pennsylvania Gazette demonstrates,17 2 fur-
thermore, the quantitative increase meaning of "progress" was quite
rare. I found only twenty-one numerical uses out of a total of 575 oc-
currences of the word "progress."
The next problem is clarity. Why use an unusual meaning of a
common word when more usual words exist?173 My research evi-
dences that an eighteenth century writer of English who wanted to
indicate a desire for qualitative improvement would have been more
likely to use some form of "improvement,"'174 "perfection,"'175 or "ad-
vancement."176 Pinkney, for example, suggested that Congress have
the power "to encourage by premiums & provisions, the advancement
of useful knowledge and of discoveries," echoing Bacon's treatise.177
172. See infra Section V.B.
173. "Clearness is secured by using the words (nouns and verbs alike) that are current
and ordinary." Aristotle, Rhetoric, in RHEToRIc AND POEiS 167 (Modem Li-
brary ed. 1954). See also MuRuAY, supra, note 130, at 188 ("Hardly in the lan-
guage are there two words that convey precisely the same idea... to be full and
easy, and at the same time correct and exact in the choice of every word, is no
doubt one of the highest and most difficult attainments in writing."); id. at 191
("Whatever leaves the mind in any sort of suspense as to the meaning, ought to be
avoided with great care."); Witherspoon, supra note 130, at 245, 272, 291 (insist-
ing on clarity as well as brevity).
174. Thomas Reid, a member of the Scottish Enlightenment with strong influence on
colonial North America, uses "improvement" for Idea of Progress quality increase.
See ThoMAs REID, INQUIRY AND ESSAYS 31 (Keith Lehrer & Ronald E. Beanblos-
som eds., Bobbs-Merrill paperback ed. 1983) (1863) (showing use of "improve-
ment" by suggesting that "[olne of the noblest purposes of sound undoubtedly is
language, without which mankind would hardly be able to attain any degree of
improvement above the brutes"); id. at 32 ("But the origin of language deserves to
be more carefully enquired into, not only as this inquiry may be of importance for
the improvement of language, but as is related to the present subject, and tends
to lay open some of the first principles of human nature."); id. at 33 ("These artifi-
cial signs [words with merely conventional denotations] must multiply with the
arts of life, and the Improvements of knowledge."); see also WILLS, supra note
101, at 181-89 (discussing importance of Reid's philosophy, especially its reliance
on common sense).
175. Defoe's Robinson Crusoe repeatedly uses forms of "perfection" and "improvement"
in this way. See DANIEL DEFOE, THE LIFE AND STRANGE ADvENTURES OF ROBIN-
SON CRUSOE, OF YORK, MARIER 123, 145, 154 (Oxford World Classics ed. 1999).
Defoe wrote in careful imitation of the language the characters would actually
have used. See J. M. Coetzee, Introduction, in id. at v, vii. Robinson Crusoe ap-
peared in 1719 and sold very well. See id. at v. Crusoe was a man of"the upper
station of Low Life," that is a person of the "middle state." He had a "house edu-
cation" and what ever further instruction was available at a "country free-school."
DEFOE, supra, at 5-6. Jonathan Swift has multiple such uses of variations on
"perfection" and "improvement." See Swift, Gulliver's Travels, in SwIFT, supra
note 166, at 31, 43, 110, 134, 137, 168, 179, 181, 184, 262, 272; Swift, Tale of A
Tub, in id., at 278, 282, 331.
176. See Swift, The Bickerstaff Papers, supra note 166, at 466.
177. Jessica Litman kindly suggested that "progress" means "advancement." I re-
spectfully disagree. "Advancement" is not an acceptable definition because (i) the
Framers chose not to use it, despite this suggestion by Pinkney, and (ii) it has the
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Additionally, the wide meaning of "science" makes "qualitative im-
provement" an unreasonable goal for an eighteenth century American.
"Science" included all knowledge, especially all subjects of study.' 7 8
Not all of these can reasonably be supposed capable of qualitative im-
provement. Consider the "science" often touted as central to educa-
tion, moral philosophy.179  If "progress" means "qualitative
improvement," we seem to be imputing to a mass of eighteenth cen-
tury Christians the belief that human effort will improve on the les-
same clarity problems as "progress." See infra note 201 (discussing definition).
The Framers might, of course, have chosen "progress" or "advancement" because
they allowed multiple interpretations. Distinguish, however, between (1) a word
with several distinct meanings, but which is properly read in only one sense in
any specific placement, and (2) a word which refers to an elastic concept, such as
"reasonable." The Constitution abounds in type 2 words, but not in type 1 words.
Based on the linguistic evidence discussed below, see supra Section V, I think
that in the eighteenth century, "progress" was a type 1 word.
178. See supra note 137 (quoting Webster's definition). Johnson defines "science" as
"1. Knowledge... 2. Certainty grounded on demonstration... 3. Art attained by
precepts, or built on principles... 4. Any art or species oflmowledge... 5. One of
the seven liberal arts, grammar, rhetorick, logick, artithmetick, musick, geome-
try, astronomy." 2 SAAUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1715 (Librairie Du Liban photo. reprint 1978) (1773). Political economy is a
branch of the science of the statesman or legislature. See ADAm SNmrH, THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 397 (Modem Library ed., n.d.) (1776). See also id. at 724-26
(discussing moral philosophy, logic, the nature of God, the nature of the human
mind, metaphysics, physics, and ontology as sciences). Francis Bacon divided sci-
ence into three branches, "Astrology, Natural Magicke, and Alcumy." BACON,
supra note 128, at 27. Bacon also names as "sciences" logic, rhetoric, history,
natural history, medicine, metaphysics, mathematics, perspective, astronomy,
architecture, engineering, morality, law, divinity, grammar, rhetoric, poetical
meter, government, conversation, negotiation, and religion. See id. at 59, 85, 88,
110, 121, 158, 182. Humor expanded the definition of"science" even further. See
PETER OLIVER, ORIGIN & PROGRESS OF THE A~mRiCAN REBELLION (1967) (referring
to Benjamin Franklin as an "Adept in the Science of Perfidy"). "Progress" in the
book title merely indicates a history.
179. See Miller, supra note 110, at 18; see also 2 JAMES BEATrE, ELEAENTS OF MORAL
SCIENCE 10, 21 (Garland Publishers photo. reprint 1977) (1790-93) (asserting
that man's two ends are action and knowledge, of which action is primary, and
that conscience is man's supreme faculty to whose decisions all other human fac-
ulties should defer); JmEs BEArm, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND ImUTABILITY
OF TRUTH IN OPPOSITION TO SOPHISTRY AND SCOEPTicism 4-5, 14-15, 21 (Rout-
ledeg/Thomemmes Press photo. reprint 1996) (1771) (listing "moral philosophy"
as a science, identifying "moral philosophy" with the "science of human nature,"
and declaring that the latter is "commonly acknowledged" to be the "most impor-
tant"); SHAFTsBURY, CHARACTERISTICS OF MEN, MANNERS, OPINIONS, TIMES 133,
152 (Lawrence E. Klein ed., 1999) (1711) (referring to study of human behavior
and morals as sciences); id. at 360 (referring to religion as a science); Wither-
spoon, supra note 110, at 152, 154 (asserting that students should start their
study with the "nature of man"; "moral philosophy is that branch of science which
treats of the principles and laws of duty or morals").
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sons taught by Jesus and the Scriptures.SO The literary sciences are
also problematic. Rhetoric, poetry, and drama are "sciences" in eight-
eenth century terminology. Would the general public of the United
States (or even a major segment of the Framers) go on record that
later authors will out shine Cicero, Homer, and Sophocles? I find this
doubtful in light of these ancients almost canonical placement in the
scholarly pantheon.18 1
The contrary assumption makes the Framers bad politicians. Fear
that any denigration of revealed religion would lead to the total break-
down of civilization was common in the eighteenth century.182 Even if
the majority of the drafters took an extreme modernist position on
literature and religion, why enshrine this position in a constitution?
At the least, antagonizing supporters of ancient writers or apostles
seems an absurd way to start an important, contentious, political
battle.
Assuming, arguendo, that "progress" originally meant "qualitative
improvement," what happens to the Progress Clause if we accept cur-
rent scepticism about the possibility of objective decisions on qualita-
tive improvement in some types of "science"?i 83 Many commentators
180. But see, e.g., JACQUES-BENIGNE BossuET, DIscouRsE ON UNIVERSAL HISTORY 114
(Elborg Forester trans., Orest Ranum ed., 1976) (1681) (doctrines of religion have
existed "without interruption and without alteration" since "beginning of the
world"). Bossuet was the Catholic chaplain at the court of Louis XIV of France
and tutored the royal heir. See Orest Ranum, Editor's Introduction, in id. at xiv,
XXX.
181. See, e.g., BossuET, supra note 180, at 70 (providing that Latin poetry was at the
point of "supreme perfection" at the time of Virgil and Horace). See also BEATTmE,
ESSAY ON TRuTH, supra note 179, at 499 ("That the ancient painters and
statuaries were superior to the modern is universally allowed."); 2 HUGH BLAIR,
LEcrTmEs ON RHETORIC AND BELLES LETrERS 218-19 (Garland Publishing photo.
reprint 1970) (1785) (arguing that the ancients surpassed the moderns in elo-
quence of rhetoric); TURGOT, supra note 96, at 61, 103 (providing that in the "arts
of taste, to painting, poetry, and music," we have become more knowledgeable
about these arts "without having surpassed or even attained in the arts of design
that sublime beauty of which Greece (over a very short period) provided the mod-
els"). But see 1 HOME, supra note 107, at 281 ("In a word, Homer was a blazing
star, and the more to be admired, because he blazed in an obscure age. But that
he should in no degree be tainted with the imperfections of such an age, is a wild
thought: it is scarce possible, but by supposing him to be more than man."). See
generally 3 BLAIR, supra, at 1-18 (discussing ancientlmodern controversy and con-
cluding that in studies involving facts, the moderns are more correct, while in
areas involving taste and sentiment, the ancients are largely unmatched).
182. See BEATTIE, supra note 179, at 331 ("If a man can reconcile himself to atheism,
which is the greatest of all absurdities, I fear I shall hardly put him out of conceit
with his doctrine, which I show him, that other less enormous absurdities are
implied in it."); see also Roger J. Robinson, Introduction, in id. at v, vii-ix (describ-
ing commonness and depth of such fear).
183. See, e.g., Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, supra note 15, at 1800 (recog-
nizing general "agnosticism about prospects for value-neutrality" in the legal sys-
tem's treatment of copyrightable subject matter). But see Riley M Sinder et al.,
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have noted the later importance of scientific advances which were
originally seen as mere curiosities.I8 4 As for literature, art, and mu-
sic, Justice Holmes warned us in 1903 that "[ilt would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute them-
selves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits."185 If Congress can only grant in-
tellectual property rights which promote "progress," but we have no
objective way to decide what constitutes "progress," we have three op-
tions-all bad.
First option, because we must take the Constitution's limits seri-
ously, and because Congress cannot tell if any proposed action is
within constitutional limits, Congress no longer has power to grant
intellectual property rights. No one wants this result.
Second option, because no one can demonstrate that Congress'
"progress" guess is wrong, and because Congress is presumed to act
constitutionally,18 6 Congress can grant any exclusive intellectual
property rights it wishes. This seems to be Merges' position.' 8 7 Op-
tion two, however, stands the Federalists' claims of a limited govern-
ment on their head. Albeit in dicta, furthermore, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly asserted a limit lurking in the phrase "to promote the
progress of science and useful arts."'8 8
Third option, Congress cannot be sure what produces higher qual-
ity, so Congress may act to promote greater quantity on the assump-
tion that some of the additional writings and discoveries will raise
quality. This is the best of the three approaches, but it still has sev-
eral problems. First, we are amending the Constitution without the
required process. Second, we are selectively allowing the Constitu-
tion's words to change meaning over time-discarding both consis-
tency and the Original Meaning approach.
In sum, the leading alternatives to "spread" as the definition of
"progress" do not work in the context of the Progress Clause. Now
Promoting Progress: The Supreme Court's Duty of Care, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 71,
78, 92-94 (1996) (asserting that Supreme Court is value neutral when deciding
patent cases and arguing that Court should act similarly in civil rights cases by
not imposing specific solutions).
184. See, e.g., Gerald Weissman, Nullius in Verba, in THEY ALL LAUGHED AT CHRISTO-
PHER COLUMBUS, 109, 118-19 (1987) (pointing out that microbes seen under
Hooke's microscope in 1660s were not linked to disease for about 200 years; "They
remained playthings for amateur curiosity," unlike astronomy whose tie to useful
navigation was recognized immediately).
185. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
186. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 184 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("he enactments of Congress are entitled to a presumption of consti-
tutionality... ."); NoRmiAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 45:11 (6th ed. 2000).
187. See Merges, supra note 69, at 587.
188. See supra note 83 (listing cases).
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that I have explained why "spread" should be accepted if it is a possi-
ble definition, let us turn to the overwhelming linguistic evidence that




Dictionary definitions have a pedigree in constitutional interpreta-
tion. The Supreme Court cited dictionaries in approximately two hun-
dred cases during the 1990s.18 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist famously
used "the first American Dictionary," Noah Webster's 1828 edition, to
define "establishment" in the Bill of Rights.190 Dr. Samuel Johnson's
famous tome has also figured in constitutional jurisprudence. 19 1 I
will, therefore, start with these judicially approved sources-and then
discuss why they are problematic evidence.
Johnson provides five definitions of the noun "progress." First
"course; procession; passage" as illustrated by Shakespeare's line "I
cannot, by the progress of the stars, Give guess how near to day."'1
92
Second is "advancement; motion forward," illustrated only by lines
involving physical motion.193 As definition three, Johnson separates
189. See Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Remains a Fortress:
An Update, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 51, 51-52 (2001).
190. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
191. See, e.g., Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Rep., 525 U.S. 316, 347 (1999)
(Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335 (1998);
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-30 (1993).
192. 2 JOHNSON, supra note 178, at 1532.
193. See id. For example, Johnson quotes Raleigh's History, "Out of Ethiopia beyond
Egypt had been a strange progress for ten hundred thousand men." Id. The sen-
tence quoted from Locke seems different: "It is impossible the mind should ever
be stopped in its progress in this space." In context, however, Locke is describing
human conception of physical space. The sentence is part of Paragraph 4 in
Chapter 17, "Infinity," in Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
Paragraph 4 reads in full:
4. Our idea of space boundless. This, I think, is the way whereby the
mind gets the idea of infinite space. It is a quite different consideration,
to examine whether the mind has the idea of such a boundless space
actually existing; since our ideas are not always proofs of the existence of
things: but yet, since this comes here in our way, I suppose I may say,
that we are apt to think that space in itself is actually boundless, to
which imagination the idea of space or expansion of itself naturally leads
us. For, it being considered by us, either as the extension of body, or as
existing by itself, without any solid matter taking it up, (for of such a
void space we have not only the idea, but I have proved, as I think, from
the motion of body, its necessary existence), it is impossible the mind
should be ever able to find or suppose any end of it, or be stopped any-
where in its progress in this space, how far soever it extends its thoughts.
Any bounds made with body, even adamantine walls, are so far from
putting a stop to the mind in its further progress in space and extension
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out "intellectual improvement; advancement in knowledge;
proficience."194 Fourth, "progress" may mean "removal from one place
to another." Fifth, a "progress" is "a journey of state; a circuit" as Ba-
con describes, "Ie gave order, that there should be nothing in his jour-
ney like unto a warlike march, but rather like unto the progress of a
king in full peace."' 95 In sum, Johnson supplies definitions including
both physical movement and mental change. Physical motion
predominates.
The 1828 Webster also emphasizes the physical motion aspect of
"progress." The first definition is "a moving or going forward," for ex-
ample, "a man makes a slow progress or a rapid progress on a jour-
ney."196 The second is "a moving forward in growth; increase; as the
progress of a plant." Third is "advance in business of any kind; as the
progress of a negotiation; the progress of arts." Fourth, is an "advance
in knowledge; intellectual or moral improvement; proficiency." For ex-
ample, "[tihe student is commended for progress in learning; the chris-
tian for his progress in virtue and piety." The fifth definition is
"removal; passage from place to place." Sixth is "a journey of state, a
circuit," a usage credited to Addison and Blackstone.197 The source is
interesting because American colonists were devotees of Blackstone's
that it rather facilitates and enlarges it. For so far as that body reaches,
so far no one can doubt of extension; and when we are come to the ut-
most extremity of body, what is there that can there put a stop, and
satisfy the mind that it is at the end of space, when it perceives that it is
not; nay, when it is satisfied that body itself can move into it? For, if it
be necessary for the motion of body, that there should be an empty space,
though ever so little, here amongst bodies; and if it be possible for body
to move in or through that empty space;--nay, it is impossible for any
particle of matter to move but into an empty space; the same possibility
of a body's moving into a void space, beyond the utmost bounds of body,
as well as into a void space interspersed amongst bodies, will always
remain clear and evident: the idea of empty pure space, whether within
or beyond the confines of all bodies, being exactly the same, differing not
in nature, though in bulk; and there being nothing to hinder body from
moving into it. So that wherever the mind places itself by any thought,
either amongst, or remote from all bodies, it can, in this uniform idea of
space, nowhere find any bounds, any end; and so must necessarily con-
clude it, by the very nature and idea of each part of it, to be actually
infinite.
Id. (emphasis added), available at http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/-econ/ugcm/3113/
locke/Essay.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2001).
194. For example, from Locke, "Several defects in the understanding hinder it in its
progress to knowledge." 2 JoHNsoN, supra note 178, at 1532.
195. See id.




Commentaries.198 A royal visit to the outlying districts may, there-
fore, be the eighteenth-century's core example of a "progress."19 9
Webster's third definition is confusing. Why is "advancement in
business" the same meaning as "advancement in arts"? Is Webster
using "art" to mean "hand craft"?20 0 The best reading of Webster's
third definition is change over time towards a specific goal-as com-
pleting a business negotiation or finishing a piece of hand crafting. I
found repeated use of this definition in the Pennsylvania Gazette.2o1
In sum, these two dictionaries evidence the importance of physical
motion in the 1789 meaning of "progress."
Dictionary making by Johnson or Webster is not, however, the best
evidence of word usage in the 1789 United States. Such early diction-
aries were fundamentally prescriptive, not descriptive. We have an
unimpeachable source for this, Johnson's and Webster's own descrip-
tions of their dictionary projects.
Johnson wished his dictionary to spur "the improvement of [his]
native tongue[ ],202 "instruct" its readers, 2O3 and "fix the English lan-
198. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 88-89 (2d ed. 1973).
199. See also SUSIE I. TUCKER, PROTEAN SHAPE: A STUDY iN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VO-
CABULARY AND USAGE 185 (1967) (asserting that "Royal Progresses were still
remembered.... College officials and Judges still made Progresses in the eight-
eenth century").
200. Webster's definition of"art" includes "the modification of things by human skills,"
as opposed to "nature." He also defines "art" as a "system of rules, serving to
facilitate the performance of certain actions" which is opposed to the "speculative
principles" of "science." Yet, Webster's "arts" include both the "useful" or
"mechanic" (in which the hands and body are most concerned) and the "liberal" or
"polite" (with mind predominating, e.g. poetry, music, painting). See WEBSTER,
supra note 136, at unnumbered page headed "ARR ARS ART."
201. Other explanations are possible. Webster's third definition might translate into
earning more money in either business or a hand craft. Webster may be referring
to change in practice over time. If so, Webster is unclear on whether qualitative
improvement is a necessary component of the "advancement." Webster's multiple
definitions of "advance" and "advancement" do not answer these questions with
certainty. The definitions include physical movement, improvement, and giving
temporally beforehand. The "trade" definition is "additional price; profit; as, an
advance on the prime cost of the goods." WEBSTER, supra note 136, at unnum-
bered page headed "ADU ADV ADV."
"Moving towards a pre-set goal" is an unlikely meaning for "progress" in the
Constitution because the spectacular advances in physical sciences in the 17th
and 18th centuries commonly led to the conclusion that "no bounds could be put
to their further development." Ronald L. Meek, Introduction, in TURGOT ON PRO-
GRESS, SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 1, 29 (1973). See also TURGOT, supra note 96,
at 113 ("The sciences, which are based on the combination or the knowledge of
objects, are as boundless as nature. The arts, which are only relations to our-
selves, are as limited as we are"; even the arts, while reaching perfection in cer-
tain respects, are "capable of continuous progress in other respects").
202. JOHNSON, supra note 166, at 2. The Plan is written in the form of a letter to
Johnson's patron, Philip Dormer, Earl of Chesterfield. Id. at 1.
203. See id. at 5.
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guage."2 0 4 Johnson intended to include "the words and phrases used
in the general [polite] intercourse of life, [and] found in the works of
those... commonly stile[d] the polite writers, 20 5 "the best writers" as
chosen by Pope.2 06 Johnson's definitions are both upper class and in-
herently English-as opposed to American.
As for Webster,2 07 while on the correct continent, his work is al-
most fifty years post-ratification. Words changed rapidly in that time
period in the United States.20s Webster did attempt to insert Ameri-
can words and American meanings for words, especially words with
political overtones,2 0 9 but he did not claim to have taken any survey of
public usage to obtain accurate definitions. Like Dr. Johnson, Web-
ster relied on the best writers, but, unlike Johnson, Webster's "best
writers" included Americans such as Franklin, Washington, and
Kent.2 1o
In sum, dictionary definitions are not enough. 2 11 The dictionaries
are not empirical reports on the word usage of any group of persons.
Additionally, Johnson is on the wrong continent and Webster is al-
most fifty years too late. Furthermore, each word has multiple dic-
tionary definitions. You do not have to believe in an evolving
Constitution to refuse determinative weight to either Webster or
Johnson.
204. Id. at 11 (discussing pronunciation).
205. Id. at 4.
206. Id. at 21, 31. Johnson considered himself to be purifying the English language as
the French Academy had done for the French tongue. See id. at 29-30.
207. Webster was not an unbiased spectator as to the meaning of the Progress Clause.
See, e.g., Letter from Noah Webster to Senator Daniel Webster (Sept. 30, 1826),
reprinted in NOAH WEBSTER, A COLLECTION OF PAPERS ON POLITICAL, LITERARY,
AND MORAL SuBJEcTs (Burt Franklin ed. 1968) (1843) (requesting perpetual pro-
tection for his writings). But see DAvD MICEELTHWAIT, NOAH WEBSTER AND THE
AmERICAN DICTIONARY 2, 10 -11, 82-83 (2000) (providing that Webster inconsis-
tently wanted extreme protection for books he issued even though he borrowed
heavily from earlier works).
208. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 102, at 345 (describing change in meaning of the word
"gentleman"). See also McDoNALD, supra note 101, at 71-72, 284-91 (discussing
changes in meaning of words "federal," "federation," "republic," and
"republican.").
209. Webster, Preface, supra note 136, at second unnumbered page.
210. See id.
211. The upper class and prescriptive focus of these dictionaries, furthermore, high-
light the evidentiary issue I discuss more fully in the companion piece to this
article, The Constitution as Promise: Textualism, Originalism, and Evidentiary
Bias. Even if one accepts the original meaning theory of constitutional exegesis,
whose "ordinary meaning" is relevant? The drafters? The delegates to the ratify-
ing conventions? The persons who elected those delegates? The persons who
were legally entitled to elect those delegates? What about the persons living in




B. The Pennsylvania Gazette
The electronic age has provided a wonderful new access point to
18th century American word usage. We now have searchable access
to the full text of each surviving issue of the New York Times of the
American colonies, the Pennsylvania Gazette. Because "progress" is
not a technical word of the legal art, I consider the word usage of the
Pennsylvania Gazette the best currently available evidence of what
1789 American residents would have understood from the word "pro-
gress" in the Progress Clause. Many ordinary Americans limited their
reading to the Bible and the newspapers. 2 12 The word "progress" does
not appear in the King James Version of the Bible.213 Because the
Progress Clause also lacks exposition in the standard sources of origi-
nal intent/meaning,2 14 many originalist scholars should agree on the
Gazette's primacy.
To decide the meaning of "progress," I ran a full text search for just
that one word in all existing issues of the Pennsylvania Gazette
printed from its inception through the end of the eighteenth century.
I located 575 uses of the word "progress." Based on the results, I for-
mulated five distinct definitions. I then divided the occurrences into
six categories: the five definitions and mere quotations of the constitu-
tional clause. 2 15 The results are:
Definition Occurrences
[a quote of the phrase in the Constitution] 6
movement through time, i.e. a chronologically arranged account
without implication of qualitative improvement 2 1 6  80
numerical increase without implication of qualitative
improvement 21
change or action towards a pre-set goal, e.g. progress towards
finishing a book 125
qualitative improvement 124
physical movement without implication of qualitative
improvement, e.g. progress of a fire or a traveler 213
212. See FORREST McDONALD & ELLEN SHAPIRO McDoNALD, REQUIEM: VARIATIONS ON
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY THEMES 9 (1988).
213. I base this assertion on my on-line search. See http'J/www.avl6ll.orgjv (last
visited July 4, 2001). The King James' version was the standard American Bible
at least until Noah Webster published the first American revision of the Bible in
1833. See THURSTON GREENE, THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION, at Xviii
(1991).
214. See supra section III.
215. Some of the decisions are difficult and disputable. Therefore, I originally placed
doubtful occurrences into the "quality improvement" category. See infra text ac-
companying notes 223-230 (removing some from this category).
216. Neither Johnson nor Webster lists this meaning of "progress," unless you force
Webster's second definition into teleological chronology. Yet, in his pamphlet on
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These results do not support the usual assumption that "the pro-
gress of science and useful arts" means qualitative improvement in
"science" and "useful arts." By far, the most common use of "progress"
was for destructive physical movement. The single most common
word in the phrase "the progress of.. . ." is "fire." The Gazette speaks
of the "progress of a fire" when a modern newspaper would report its
"spread." Fifty-one times fire made a "progress" through some human
construction, such as a house. Eighty-five times the geographical
"progress" was by an armed man, group of men, or an entire army-
quite often the enemy's troops. Thirteen times some illness made a
"progress." The Gazette also reported the "progress" of other destruc-
tive entities-such as ravenous insects, 21 7 bad weather,218 and possi-
bly hostile ships.21 9 This pattern of use is inconsistent with the
persistent assumption that in colonial North America "progress"
meant "qualitative improvement."
The result is even more striking when one notes that the text of the
proposed federal Constitution, the Federalist Papers, and numerous
other ratification discussions were printed in the Pennsylvania
Gazette.
The Federalist Papers, for example, contain two uses of the word
"progress," 220 neither of which involves qualitative improvement. The
Federalist printed in the November 14, 1787 issue of the Pennsylvania
Gazette referred to the "progress of hostility and desolation" among
the colonies during the Revolutionary War; the same description of
the colonists also asserts that "their habitations were in flames" and
"many of their citizens were bleeding."2 2 1 Federalist No. 5 uses "pro-
gress" while arguing that multiple confederacies are not a good idea
because, inter alia, they will not remain "on an equal footing in point
the Constitution, Webster's two uses of the word "progress" are best read as
invoking "chronological ordering" or "history." See WEBSTER, supra note 102, at
29, 58. For quality improvement, the pamphlet uses variations of perfection,
improvement, and advancement. See id. at 30, 31, 34, 36, 41 n.*, 58, 64.
"Chronological progression," furthermore, does not create a viable, separate
meaning for the Progress Clause. The Clause would translate into: "Congress
shall have the power... to promote the chronological progression of science and
the useful arts, by... f This presumably means that Congress is allowed to
speed up change in knowledge and technology. That power, however, seems
identical to a power to promote the "qualitative improvement" or "quantitative
improvement" of knowledge and technology.
217. To access the Pennsylvania Gazette, I used an online archive. See http'//
srch.accessible.com. See Archive Item Numbers 45706 (twice), 60587, 73571,
75075, and 75508.
218. See Pennsylvania Gazette Archive Item Numbers 01164 (twice), 42736, and
70594.
219. See Pennsylvania Gazette Archive Item Numbers 04118 and 06546.
220. This is in addition to the constitutional quote in The Federalist No. 43, supra note
161.
221. Pennsylvania Gazette, Archive Item Number 74382.
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of strength." "Independent of those local circumstances which tend to
beget and increase power in one part, and to impede its progress in
another, we must advert to the effects of that superior policy and good
management.. "222
Let us, now, look more closely at the 124 entries where "progress"
might mean some type of qualitative improvement (but not change
over time towards a pre-set goal). The following chart lists the sub-
jects which were said to progress qualitatively:
Subject Occurrences
individual humans or schools 15
populated geographic areas 27
religious vices or virtues 12
Arts 4
commerce & manufacturing 10
Mankind 7
Architecture 1













arts & sciences 2
geographic knowledge 1




222. Pennsylvania Gazette, Archive Item Number 74466 (emphasis added).
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Next, we should recognize the difference between a person (or per-
sons22 3 ) showing qualitative improvement in a skill or pre-existing
knowledge set and the improvement of the knowledge set available.
Only the second is The Idea of Progress. The first is the acquiring of
personal proficiency-as covered by Webster's fourth definition and
Johnson's third. Congruently, both of Webster's examples of this defi-
nition involve a person obtaining more proficiency. At least three of
Johnson's five examples involve increase in some specific person's pro-
ficiency in knowledge or virtue. 224
Seventy of the Gazette's "quality" occurrences refer to increase in
proficiency by some person or group of persons: "progress" by schools,
individuals, populated geographic areas, and the national assembly.
Several of the other progressing subjects are likely to be increasing in
quality by increasing geographically or quantitatively (numerically or
in economic value)-religious vices and virtues, commerce & manufac-
turing, public & private improvements, agriculture and commerce,
revolution, illness, and dangerous innovations; these total another
thirty-two occurrences. Deducting the three oddities, the proficiency
increases, and the quantity increases, leaves us only twenty possible
occurrences of "progress" for quality improvement in the fund of
knowledge, The Idea of Progress.
To recheck, I went back through my notes looking for occurrences
of "progress" that might be references to improvement in the knowl-
edge-base. I found forty-six which, on first reading, might be so con-
strued. 22 5 However, a more critical review of these forty-six
occurrences of "progress" demonstrates the paucity of relevant Idea of
Progress uses. First, seventeen are from after ratification. They may
easily be unreflective echoes of the constitutional phrase. Fully thirty
are puffs-writings intended for emotional effect, such as advertise-
ments or ceremonial speeches. The empowering clauses of a legal doc-
223. I classified improvement by "mankind," i.e. all humans, as improvement of the
knowledge set.
224. The two examples which facially invoke the qualitative improvement of man-
kinds knowledge base are: "'Several defects in the understanding hinder it in its
progress to knowledge.' Locke." and "'[i]t is strange, that men should not have
made more progress in the knowledge of these things.' Burne." 2 JOHNSON, supra
note 178, at 1532. The Burnet quote does refer to qualitative improvement of
man's knowledge base. Burnet is disproving Aristotle's theory that the current
earth is eternal. Burnet argues that men have very imperfect knowledge of geog-
raphy and navigation. Assuming the world is only 6000 years old, as the Bible
states, "[iut is strange, that men should not have made more progress in the
knowledge of these things." If men had existed forever, their ignorance would be
even more unfathomable. See BuRNET, supra note 127, at 46. I failed to locate





ument use language much more precisely.2 26 Many of the references
to books may easily be using "progress" in the historical/temporal or-
ganization sense. A number are more reasonably read as referring to
geographic spread or numerical increase.
Let us look more closely at the Gazette's numerous "progress"-men-
tioning advertisements for books-some available to buy and others
which will become available if the advertiser receives sufficient ad-
vance subscriptions. The most common such book advertised is
Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress.2 27 In that famous religious text, "pro-
gress" is an allegorical journey.2 28 In 1771, James Beattie, a well
226. Eighteenth century writers were quite taken with the concept that different
modes of discourse belonged to different occasions and subjects. See Aristotle,
supra note 173, at 196 ("[E]ach kind of rhetoric has its own appropriate style.");
JAMEs BEATTIE, ESSAYS: ON POETRY AND Music 7 (1996) ("[Tihe essential or indis-
pensable rules of an art are those that direct to the accomplishment of the end
proposed by the artist."). See also DANIEL DEFOE, THE COMPLETE ENGLISH
TRADESMAN 7 (Historical Conservation Society photo. reprint 1989) (4th ed. 1738)
("[A] tradesman's letters should be plain, concise, and to the purpose; no quaint
expressions, no book-phrases, no flourishes.. . ."); JOHN TENNENT, EVERY MAN
His OwN DOCTOR 8 (microformed on Early American Imprints, 2d series no. 2200)
(4th ed. 1802) ("In setting down the following prescriptions, I have been cautious
of talking like an apothecary; that is, of using hard words, that perhaps neither
my patient, nor I myself understand."). Compare id. at 7 ("[T1he symptoms can-
not be easily be mistaken."), with [Dr.] Thomas Young, Letter Printed in Penn-
sylvania Gazette Oct. 17, 1775 at 1 (Accessible Archives Item No. 58370) ("I must
beg your favor to convey this general intelligence to all who may think my poor
advice worthy of their attention, namely, that the grand mystery in our profes-
sion is, to determine accurately the peculiar constitution, habit, particular dispo-
sition, natural or accidental, of every patient we take upon us to advise.
Understanding then to satisfaction how such patient has been, as to the common
operation of the several functions of the body, we are next to examine into the
several deviations from that standard which now take place in the system[.]").
227. See Pennsylvania Gazette Archive Item Numbers 06302 (1744), 06382 (1744),
5272 (1742), 04907 (1742), 04850 (1741), 04533 (1741), 36763 (1765)35749 (1765),
34048 (1764), 19071 (1755), 10647 (1749), and 27581 (1761) (including advertise-
ments for Pilgrim's Progress).
228. The Pilgrim's Progress is John Bunyan's addition to a pre-existing genre of relig-
ious books using a journey as an allegory for a sinner's attempt to attain salva-
tion. See, e.g., Memoir of John Bunyan, in THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS 1, 4 (Fleming
H. Revell ed., n.d.) (mentioning that Bunyan's wife owned a copy of THE PLAIN
MAN'S PATHEWAY TO HEAVEN). The journey allegory is noted in, for example, the
fuller title, THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS FROM THIS WORLD TO THAT WHICH Is TO
COME, DELIVERED UNDER THE SIMILITUDE OF A DREAM: WHEREIN Is DISCOVERED
THE MANNER OF HIS SETTING OUr, HIS DANGEROUS JOURNEY, AND SAFE ARRIVAL AT
THE DESIRED COUNTRY (1678). See also, e.g. BUNYAN, supra, at 13 (the saints'
'journey"); 19 ("This book will make a traveler of thee."); 21 ("As I walked through
the wilderness of this world .... ."); 42 (Christian describing himself as "a trav-
eler" requesting "help to me in my journey"). A more modern, comic use of "pro-
gress" for a journey of discovery is MARK TwAIN'S, THE INNOCENTS ABROAD, OR
THE NEW PILGRIMS' PROGRESS: BEING AN ACCOUNT OF THE STEAMSHIP QUAKER
CITY'S PLEASURE EXCURSION TO EUROPE AND THE HOLY LAND (Harper & Bros.
Publ. ed. 1906) (1869).
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known literary scholar, published The Minstrel; or, The Progress of
Genius, recounting the allegorical journey of a poetical genius. 2 29
Many titles include the phrase "the rise and progress of _". These
books are merely histories, as shown by the chronological use of the
term "progress" in descriptions of books with the word "history" in
their titles.230
None of the forty-six possibilities avoids all of these problems.
In summation, the Pennsylvania Gazette entries demonstrate that
"progress" was overwhelming used to mean something other than
qualitative improvement, the Idea of Progress. The most common us-
age was "spread," or some other type of physical movement.
C. Idea of Progress Literature
Even if the most common meaning of "progress" was something
other than "quality improvement of the human knowledge base," my
thesis would be problematic if the standard eighteenth century
method of denoting such quality improvement had been the word "pro-
gress." My research, however, demonstrates the opposite. During dis-
cussions of the Idea of Progress thesis, late eighteenth century
speakers of English more commonly used "improvement," "perfection,"
or "advancement" (as opposed to "progress") when referring to the bet-
terment of mankind's knowledge base.
On December 11, 1750, Turgot gave a public lecture at the Sor-
bonne on the philosophical advances of the human mind.23 1 This may
have been the public debut of the Idea of Progress thesis in its En-
lightenment formulation. 232 The philosophical theory is based on the
229. See, e.g., JmEs BEATm, THE MinsTrAL; OR THE PROGRESS OF GENIUS: wrni
OTHER POEMS 189-90, 195, 201-02, 214, 216 (1811) (showing hero is traveling).
THE MiNsTaAL sold five large editions in less than four years and attracted major
attention abroad in several translations. See Alexander Chalmers, Memoirs of
the Life of Dr. James Beattie, in id. at iii, xii. Beattie's book is advertised in
Pennsylvania Gazette Archive Item Number 70456 (1784). The Gazette also in-
cludes an advertisement for the picture series The Rake's Progress. See Penn-
sylvania Gazette Archive Item Number 24217 (1760). This is one of two famous
etching series by Hogarth showing the life and infamous death of moral types, an
outgrowth of the allegorical journey genre. The other picture set is THE HARLor's
PROGRESS. See HENRY FIELDING, ToM JONES 91, 139 (Penguin Paperback ed.
1966) (1749) (mentioning The Harlot's Progress).
230. See Pennsylvania Gazette Archive Item Number 59857.
231. See Meek, supra note 201, at 6.
232. See id. at 11. The standard alternative European view of human history was
Christian. See, e.g., Bossuwr, supra note 180, at 114 (presenting history of man-
kind with strong reliance on the Bible). See also BURNET, supra note 127
(presenting a biblically-based, geological history of the earth). The relationship
between secular progress theses and religious hope in a messianic age is complex
and disputed. Compare, e.g., Meek, supra note 201, at 29 (asserting that Turgot's
theory was both an alternative to and strongly influenced by Bossuet's) and ER-
NEST LEE TIvsON, MnaLNNIUm AND UToPIA: A STuny IN THE BACKGROUND OF
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Lockian concept that man's mind at birth is a clean slate. All man's
ideas originate in some form of sensory input. Since all men basically
have the same sensory equipment and roughly similar inputs, all men
tend towards the same ideas.2 33 Over time,2 3 4 mankind as a whole
will accumulate and integrate information and ideas; over time, there-
fore, as by natural law, mankind will advance in knowledge and vir-
tue. Different nations, however, will advance at different rates
because of local conditions. Many nations, at many times, further-
more, will regress. Natural law requires merely that mankind as a
whole advance over time.23 5 Condorcet closely followed Turgot in
time and theory.2 36 Both men wrote in French.237
The Idea of Progress, of course, allows the word "progress" to accu-
mulate the disparate meanings discussed above. The history of man-
kind becomes a chronicle of mankind's improvement-thus allowing
the extension of the noun "progress" from "journey" to "allegorical
journey" to "movement through time" to "quality improvement over
time." If you believe that natural law will necessarily lead to the im-
provement of mankind over time, instances of chronological progres-
sion largely overlap instances of quality improvement. Additionally, if
you believe that the improvement of human society and its knowledge
base require the diffusion of knowledge, the "progress of knowledge"
may refer to its spread. These overlaps often obscure the writer's defi-
nition of the single word "progress."
Condorcet's Life of M. Turgot was printed in London, in English, in
1787.238 While it may have reached North America, the Pennsylvania
THE IDEAL OF PROGRESS 4 (1949) (arguing that religious, teleological approach to
the world is one ancestor of the belief in a scientific, evolutionary type of pro-
gress), with Burry, supra note 63, at 68 (describing Christian belief in "an active
intervening Providence" as opposed to the Idea of Progress).
233. This attitude is congruent with colonial North America's notorious disrespect for
professionals and specialists. See, e.g., BOORSTIN, supra note 149, at 168, 189-
265.
234. Cumulation is premised on language, especially in written form. See Turgot, A
Philosophical Review of the Successive Advances of the Human Mind, in TURGOT
ON PROGRESS, SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 41, 41-44 (Ronald L. Meeck trans. &
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1973).
235. See id. (outlining thesis); see also TURGOT ON PROGRESS, supra note 201, at 7-13
(same).
236. CONDORCET, supra note 96.
237. Condorcet's SKETCH was not published in any language until 1795. See CONDOR-
CET, supra note 94 at xiii (inside "a note on the text"). The first English language
statement of Turgot's position may have been CONDORCE s LIFE OF TURGOT
which was published in English in 1787. See TURGOT ON PROGRESS, supra note
201, at 13 n.5.
238. CONDORCET, THE LIFE OF M. TURGOT, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE FINANCES OF
FRANCE IN THE YEARS 1774, 1775, AND 1776 (1787).
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Gazette collection contains no mention of it.239 This book contains
thirty uses of the word "progress." Seventeen seem to refer to the
qualitative improvement of either some type of science or of mankind
as a whole.240 Seven refer to physical movement.24' Three could as
easily refer to the quality improvement of some type of knowledge or
the physical diffusion of that knowledge. 242 Three refer to chronologi-
cal ordering.2 43 The book, however, uses another word to mean qual-
ity improvement of either a knowledge set or mankind at least twenty-
four times. 244
Well known English-language treatments of the Idea of Progress
from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are found in books on
disparate subjects. Francis Bacon's subject was how to advance
human knowledge. His call for empiricism was followed in 1655 by
Meric Casaubon's scientific treatment of incidents commonly ex-
plained religiously. Bernard Mandeville, George Berkeley, Lord
Shaftesbury, Francis Hutchinson, and Adam Smith treat the Idea of
Progress as part of moral philosophy. Adam Smith then expands
moral philosophy into economics. 245
Let us start with Francis Bacon. Bacon usually wrote in Latin, but
around 1605 he did publish an English work addressed to James I of
England, The Twoo Bookes of Francis Bacon: Of the Proficience and
Advancement of Learning, Divine and Humane.2 46 Bacon attempts to
prove the practical usefulness of increasing mankind's knowledge of
239. I did a full text search for "turgot" and located two items, neither of which men-
tioned this volume. See Pennsylvania Gazette Archive Item Numbers 71617 and
73991.
240. See CONDORCET, supra note 238, at 15, 16, 17 (three occurrences), 116, 133, 150,
169, 190, 279 n*, 339, 360, 361, 363 (twice), 364.
241. See id. at 43, 67, 254, 257, 328, 337, 418.
242. See id. at iv, 37, 372.
243. See id. at 27, 104, 297.
244. See id. at xii, 16 (twice), 17 (twice), 89, 132, 169, 232, 258, 259, 330, 360, 361
(three times), 362, 364, 365, 367, 369, 392, 393, 394.
245. The standard eighteenth century concept of "economics" was that part of moral
science which dealt with an individual's duty to his or her family. See 2 BEAT~rE,
supra note 176 [Moral Science], at 10. Smith's extension leads to the dismal first
essay on population by Thomas Robert Malthus. Malthus was responding to one
of Godwin's essays in The Enquirer. See ROBERT THOmAS MALTHUS, POPULATION:
THE FIRST ESSAY, at xiii (1st ed. of Ann Arbor Paperback) (1798) ("The following
Essay owes its origin to a conversation with a friend, on the subject of Mr. God-
win's Essay, on avarice and profusion, in his Enquirer."). The last two works,
however, were published respectively in 1797 and 1798, after the drafting and
ratification of the U.S. Constitution. See MALTHUS, supra, at xii, xiv; WnLiAm
GODWIN, THE ENQUIRER: REFIECTIONS ON EDUCATION, MANNERS, AND LITERATURE
IN A SERIES OF ESSAYS (Garland Publishing facsimile 1971) (1797) (reproducing
date on unnumbered title page of original ed.). I, therefore, exclude them from
my "progress" survey.
246. See Michael Kiernan, Preface to FRANCIS BACON, THE ADVANCEMENT OF KNow.-
EDGE vii, vii (Michael Kiernan ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford 2000).
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the natural world, surveys the then-current state of knowledge, and
presents suggestions for action.2 47 In the course of the work, Bacon
uses the word "progress" four times-twice for a specific human's in-
crease in proficiency,248 once for a journey,2 49 and once for change
over time.250 As displayed in his title, Bacon uses "advancement"
when referring to improvement in the human knowledge base.25 1
Meric Casaubon uses the word "progress" three times in A Treatise
Concerning Enthusiasm.2 52 Twice the word means history, that is a
chronological ordering of events. 25 3 The third use denotes quality im-
provement in the sense of a specific person's obtaining proficiency.2 54
In 1711, Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, pub-
lished an almost complete collection of his earlier writings as Charac-
teristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times.25 5 The collection includes
eight uses of the word "progress." I classify seven of these as meaning
history, a chronological ordering.2 56 The eighth refers to specific per-
sons gaining proficiency. 257
Replying to Shaftesbury,25s Bernard Mandeville's The Fable of the
Bees presented the notorious thesis that many of mankind's selfish
actions help society.25 9 The first part was published under another
title in 1705, but did not attract much attention until republished in
1723. While negative comments accumulated, Mandeville wrote a sec-
ond volume which was published in 1728.260 By 1787, the work was
sufficiently well known in the United States to be referred to in a
stage play.26 1 The work runs almost 800 pages 2 6 2 but only uses the
247. See id. at xvii, xvi, xxiv.
248. See BACON, supra at 128, at 9, 23.
249. See id. at 111. This is the Bacon quote used by Johnson's dictionary. See supra
note 193 and accompanying text.
250. See BACON, supra note 128, at 191. I admit that this quote is difficult to parse. I
may, therefore, be in error.
251. See also id. at 5, 25, 27, 32, 55 (using "advancement" to mean improvement in
knowledge base).
252. See MERIC CASAUBON, A TREATISE CONCERNING ENTHUSiASM (facsimile 1970)
(1655).
253. See id. at 176, 199.
254. See id. at 184.
255. Lawrence E. Klein, Editor's Introduction to SHAiEsBURy, CHARACTERISTICS OF
MEN, MANNERS, OPINIONS, TImEs, at vii, vii (Lawrence E. Klein ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1999). Shaftesbury's optimistic philosophy links aesthetic and moral
senses; it teaches that political liberty is central to men's intellectual and cultural
achievement, which he labeled "politeness." See id. at vii, xvii-xviii.
256. See SHAFrESBURY, supra note 176, at 22, 11, 354, 395, 396, 464 (twice).
257. See id. at 202.
258. See 2 Mandeville, supra note 164, at 43.
259. See F. B. Kaye, Introduction to BERNARD MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE, OF THE BEES:
OR PRIVATE VICES, PUBLICK BENEFITS xvii, xxxix, lx-lxi (Clarendon Press, Oxford,
Eng. 1924).
260. See id. at xxxiii-xxxvi.
261. See id. at cxvii.
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word "progress" four times. One use refers to specific persons ob-
taining proficiency.26 3 One refers to approaching a set goal.2 6 4 The
other two refer to the improvement of the human race's capability or
knowledge base.26 5 When referring to the quality improvement of
human knowledge or character, however, Mandeville is much more
likely to say "perfection," "improvement," or "advance."2 66 In A Letter
to Dion, Mandeville never uses the word "progress." He does refer,
however, to "the Advancement of worldly Glory."2 67
George Berkeley wrote Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher in
Rhode Island while waiting in vain for Parliament to fund a mission-
ary college in Bermuda. Alciphron was published in England in 1732.
It quickly attracted comment, but was generally denigrated.26s The
text includes eight uses of the word "progress." Six times "progress"
means chronological ordering;2 69 once the "progress" is a metaphorical
journey by the soul;2 7 0 the last use refers to a person's increase in
proficiency.2 7 1
Looking for the word "progress," I read a number of works by Fran-
cis Hutchinson: Reflections Upon Laughter and Remarks upon the
Fable of the Bees,272 An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of
Beauty and Virtue,2 73 Reflections on Our Common Systems of Moral-
ity, and On the Social Nature of Man.2 74 I located not one use of the
262. See Mandeville, supra note 167, at xv-xvi (table of contents).
263. See id. at vol. 1, p. 288 ("Few children make any progress at school, but at the
same time they are capable of being employed in some Business or other. .. ).
264. See id. at vol. 2, p. 221 (referring to lack of "progress" towards hearing Horatio's
theory of the origin of society).
265. See id. at vol. 2,. 143 ("Which all together make a strong Proof of the slow Pro-
gress that Art [shipbuilding] has made. .. ."); id. at vol. 2, p.p.146 ("Men would
make but a small progress in good Manners the first three hundred Years [after
barbarism]. ").
266. See, e.g., id. vol. 2, at 187-88, 319-23.
267. See BERNAM MANDEVILLE, A LETTER TO DION 40 (Bonamy Dobree ed., Univ.
Press of Liverpool 1954) (1732).
268. See David Berman, Introduction to GEORGE BERKELEY, ALCIPHRON OR THE MIN-
UTE PHILOSOPHER 1, 1-2 (David Berman ed., 1993). The work is written as a
dialogue between characters representing freethinkers (including Shaftesbury
and Mandeville) and Christians (such as Berkeley). See id. at 10.
269. See GEORGE BERKELEY, ALcIPHRON OR THE MIN=U PHILOSOPHER 6, 12,24,29,52,
158 (David Berman ed., 1993).
270. See id. at 139.
271. See id. at 39.
272. FRANcis HuTcINsON, REFLECTIONS UPON LAUGHTER AND RErt pm UPON THE
FABLE OF THE BEES (Garland Publishing 1971 facsimile of 1750 ed.).
273. FRANcIs HUTCHINSON, AN INQUIRY iTrro THE ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY
AND VIRTUE (Garland Publishing facsimile 1971) (2d ed. 1726).
274. FRANCis HUTcHESON, FRANcis HUTCHINSON ON HutmAN NATURE (Thomas
Mautner ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1993) (containing both 'Reflections on Our
Common Systems of Morality," and "On the Social Nature of Man").
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word "progress." Hutchinson uses the word "improvement" when dis-
cussing qualitative advances in science or arts.2 75
Now for Adam Smith's two main works: The Theory of Moral Senti-
ments2 76 and The Wealth of Nations.2 77 The Theory of Moral Senti-
ments includes only two uses of the word "progress," neither for
quality improvement of any kind.278 The Wealth of Nations contains
many instances of the word "progress." The clearest support of my
claim (that "progress" usually does not mean "quality improvement")
is that Smith twenty-eight times uses the phrase "the progress of im-
provement" to mean the chronological progression of quality in-
crease. 27 9 In this phrase, "improvement" means "advance in quality."
In an additional thirty-eight instances, Smith uses "progress" (by it-
self) to mean chronological ordering.2 80 Twice "progress" means ad-
vancement toward a preset goal;28 once it means journey;2 8 2 once it
means a person's increase in proficiency.2 83 Smith uses "progress"
only four times to mean quality improvement of some knowledge or
skill base.28 4 Improvement in quantity (either numerical or economic)
is the best meaning of "progress" seven times. 28 5 On sixteen occa-
sions, Smith uses "progress" in a way that might mean either quantity
or quality improvement,28 6 or a mixture of both.287 Smith's favorite
meaning for "progress," therefore, is chronological ordering, i.e. his-
tory. As discussed earlier, in the Progress Clause, "progress" as
"chronological ordering" reduces into quantitative or qualitative
improvement.2 8 8
275. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 273, at 50, 54, 72.
276. SMITH, supra note 67. This work was first published in 1759. See D. D. Raphael
& Al. L. Macfie, Introduction, in id. at 1, 1.
277. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Modem Library n.d.) (1776). This book
was first published in 1776. See Max Lerner, Introduction to id. at v, vii.
278. See SMITH, supra note 67, at 88 (meaning spread or numerical increase); id. at
289 (meaning figurative movement or chronological ordering).
279. See SMITH, supra note 277, at 148, 175, 176, 217 (three times), 218, 219 (twice),
220 (twice), 224 (twice), 225, 226, 228 (twice), 229, 230, 235, 242 (twice), 318, 658,
668, 669, 738.
280. See id. at 10, 38, 51, 8 (twice), 89, 135, 191, 217, 326, 327, 328, 329, 347, 348, 356
(twice), 357, 373, 393, 397, 533 (twice), 618, 638, 651, 658, 659, 661, 664, 680
(twice), 687, 730, 734, 757, 876, 881.
281. See id. at 885, 886.
282. See id. at 654.
283. See id. at 723.
284. See id. at 347, 394, 532 (twice).
285. See id. at 533 (twice), 551, 657, 708, 757, 879.
286. See id. at 320, 360, 380, 383, 534 (twice), 537 (twice), 538 (three times), 553
(twice), 565, 590, 599.
287. By "mixture," I mean phrases such as "the progress of population and law" where
presumably the population increase is numerical and the legal increase is
qualitative.
288. See supra note 216 (discussing).
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Looking at all the linguistic evidence, I conclude that an ordinary
American of 1789 was most likely to have read "progress" in the Pro-
gress Clause of the Constitution to mean "spread," i.e. to allow Con-
gress to grant limited monopolies only when they promote the
distribution of science and the useful arts throughout the population.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article uses linguistic evidence to disprove a long standing
assumption about the Progress Clause, which gives Congress "the
power... To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by se-
curing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries." 28 9 The word "progress"
is not a reference to the Enlightenment Idea of Progress and, thus, an
anachronistic bias incapable of cabining Congress. The word "pro-
gress" means "spread." Congress does not have the power to create
any intellectual property regime it thinks will increase the Gross Na-
tional Product, campaign donations from holders of large copyright
portfolios, or world harmonization.290 Any right to exclude others
from use of writings and discoveries must promote the spread of
knowledge and technology. This clarification of the constitutional lan-
guage warrants court overthrow of both the circumvention limitations
in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the twenty year subsidy
provided copyright holders by the Copyright Term Extension Act.
Long live the public domain.2 91
289. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Cl. 8.
290. See supra note 89 (discussing Treaty Power).
291. This Article is dedicated to David Lange in partial repayment for Recognizing the
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1739 same our colony [not mentioned] same
1752 14881 human mind "an account of the advertisement for
gradual progress of "Noetica: or the first
the human mind, principles of human
from its first dawn- knowledge," author
ing of sense to the not mentioned. The
highest perfection, book is "very proper
both intellectual to form the minds
and moral of which of youth in knowl-
it is capable" edge and vir-
tue."2 9
3
1754 16632 liberal sciences [not mentioned] announcement of
lottery to raise
funds for College of
New Jersey
1755 17858 the earliest settlers of South Carolina speech by Gov. of S.
"brought with them the Laws of the Mother Carolina at opening
Country... the privilege of enacting laws of legislative session
for their good Government, without which
they could have made no progress" [but ask-
ing legislature not to pass any unusual act
without first learning King's pleasure]
1771 48758 science "in this infant coun- open letter from
try" trustees of a charity
school to Lt. Gov.
John Penn on the
sad occasion of his
return to England
292. This column provides the item number attached to the document by the database
organizer.
293. Samuel Johnson, Noetica, in ELEMENTA PHILOSPHICA: CONTAINING CHIEFLY,
NOETIcA, OR THINGS RELATING TO THE MIND OR UNDERSTANDING: AND ETHICA, OR
THINGS RELATING TO THE MORAL BEHAVIOUR (Kraus Reprint Co., 1969 facsimile
ed. of 1752 ed. printed by B. Franklin & D. Hall, Phila; Noetica is separately
paginated inside volume). Chapter VI, "Of the Progress of the Mind, towards its
highest Perfection," deals with the developmental stages through which individu-
als pass as they grow up, i.e. "progress" means increase in an individual's profi-
ciency in pre-existing knowledge and skill bases. See id. at xxxiii-xxxiv (Table of
Contents showing subject headings).
[Vol. 80:754
THE PROGRESS CLAUSE
1771 49682 "the French language is like to keep pace advertisements for
with the liberal arts and sciences which pupils to learn
have already made such great progress in French
this infant colony"
1771 49224 "Cultivation of the "your Province" Letter from man in















1773 52679 "useful arts" in America advertisement for a
locally produced
varnish
1775 57092 province of Penn- in science and liter- opening of flowery
sylvania ature political essay by
Camillus
1776 59903 arts and sciences in America address by Gover-









es on the History of
Man"2 9 4
1776 same "the origin and pro- [not mentioned] subtopic in book
gress of arts"
1776 same "the female [sex]" [not mentioned] subtopic in book
1777 60919 USA towards "an ele- address in Penn-
gance of freedom" sylvania legislature
294. See Hom, supra note 107, The Gazette advertisement is presumably for the
shorter first edition which was published in 2 volumes in 1774. See id. at unnum-
bered page before title page. Lord Kames describes his work as "a natural history
of man." Id. at vii (author's preface).
20011
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
1778 62959 truth [not mentioned] advertisement for
Dr. Price's book,
"Additional Obser-
vations on Civil Lib-
erty and the war
with America"29 5






to publish this rec-
ommendation
1783 69297 language etc. [unmentioned] advertisement for
[phrase used is 'rise Hugh Blair's book
and progress of lan- "Lectures on Rheto-
guage, etc'] ric and Belles Let-
tres" 29
6
1783 same poetry same
1786 73117 "these laudable sci- citizens of Rhode Is- ironic opening to
ences" of "fraud and land commercial an-
injustice" nouncement that a
RI person had paid
a mortgage in paper
currency
1788 75402 "political knowl- [unmentioned] Dec. 10 letter from




ments to the foeder-
al constitution"
1788 75380 "political science" [unmentioned] Dec. 3""
1788 same "our progress" "to greater perfec- same
tion"
1789 75916 the arts "their progress and advertisement for
improvement" subscription to a
dictionary especially
useful for artificers
295. See RICHARD PRICE, Two TRACTS ON CIVIL LIBERTY, THE WAR WITH AMERICA, AND
THE DEBTS AND FINANCES OF THE KINGDOM: WITH A GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND
SUPPLEMENT (De Capo Press 1972 reprint of 1778 first combined ed. of Additional
Observations on the Nature and Value of Civil Lliberty, and the War with America
and Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, The Principles of Government,
and the Justice and Policy of the War with America, first published 1777).
296. See 1 BLAIR, supra note 181, at 122 ("i shall first give a History of the Rise and
Progress of Language in several particulars... which shall be followed by a simi-
lar History of the Rise and Progress of Writing.").
[Vol. 80:754
THE PROGRESS CLAUSE
1789 76360 "an industrious and "towards wealth Letter from North
frugal people" and comfort" Carolina on inter
alia ratification of
US Const.
1789 76338 truth and reason Paris Aug. 30, 1789 letter
from Paris
1789 same "such ideas" [limita- "from the days of same









many ages in all of
Europe, it is aston-
ishing.."
1789 76353 science in not falling for from the Gazette of
delusions, such as the United States,
tales of evil spirits The Tablet No.
LXXII
1790 76728 humanity [not mentioned] announcement of
contents of the May








the college of Phila-
delphia
1790 77075 "violated rights of in France Americans should
reason and humani- congratulate them-
ty" selves on giving
France the spirit of
liberty
1790 77159 "further progress is daily making in the ge- advertisement for
ographic knowledge of our country" maps to be pub-
lished on subscrip-
tion






1791 77582 liberty USA ceremonial address
on the Anniversary
of the Columbian
Order by the Sons
of Tammany
1793 78935 architecture USA announces prize
choice in competi-
tion for plan of a
new hotel
1794 79575 the arts and sci- in the USA letter complaining




sure in prosperity of
the USA
1794 79441 mankind [not mentioned] letter from a gen-




1795 80551 arts in the USA announces inven-
tion of a machine
1796 81010 USA [not mentioned] Patriotic Toast at a
celebration of the
President's Birthday
1796 81165 human race [im- [unclear, seems to US Constitution
plied] be arts, sciences, should be amended
liberty, social happi- to clarify relative
ness, and philoso- treaty power of
phy] President and Con-
gress
1797 81970 human mind [not mentioned] discussion of distri-
bution of books to
the public libraries








1797 82039 of an enlightened to the summit of speech at entertain-
nation public virtue and ment given to Pres.
happiness Adams by the citi-
zens of New York
814 [Vol. 80:754
2001] THE PROGRESS CLAUSE
1798 82518 "sacred flame of lib- among English peo- English traitor's let-
erty" ple, including fleets ter to French gov-
and armies eminent
1798 82268 "revolutionary prin- in Cantons of Swit-
ciples" zerland
1800 83321 science [not mentioned] Toast at Indepen-
dence Day party of
the Society of Cin-
cinnati
